Coordinating Growth Management Through Consensus-Building: Incentives and the Generation of Social, Intellectual and Political Capital by Innes, J. et al.

Copyright © 1994 and 2005
by the Regents of the University of California
All rights reserved
California Policy Seminar, 1994
California Policy Research Center, 2005





About the California Policy Research Center
The California Policy Research Center, which funded this study as the California Policy
Seminar, was founded in 1977 as a systemwide University of California research and
public-service program. It applies the extensive research expertise of the UC system to the
analysis, development, and implementation of state policy and federal policy issues of
statewide importance. CPRC provides technical assistance to policymakers, commissions
policy-relevant research by UC faculty and affiliated researchers, oversees legislatively
mandated research projects, and disseminates research findings through publications,
briefings, and other activities cosponsored with university-based programs and state
government entities. 
The research on which this report was based was commissioned by the center’s Policy Re-
search Program. The report was published originally in 1994 and printed in one volume;
the reissue in 2005 has been published in PDF format as two volumes for easier Web
retrieval, but the single-volume page numbering has been retained.
The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not neces-
sarily represent the California Policy Research Center or the Regents of the University of
California.
About the Authors
When this report was published in 1994, Judith Innes was a professor in the Department
of City and Regional Planning and director of the Institute of Urban and Regional
Development at the University of California, Berkeley. Judith Gruber was an associate
professor in the Department of Political Science. Research associates Michael Neuman
and Robert Thompson were doctoral students in the Department of City and Regional
Planning. Joshua Langenthal and Joshua Kirschenbaum, who were graduate students in




Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Defining the Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Incentives, Sanctions, and Institutional Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Overview of Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Stakeholders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
Selection Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Selection Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
The Problem of Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Coming to the Table and Staying There . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
How the Processes Were Initiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Benefits of Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Costs of Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
The Cost-Benefit Calculation for Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Individual Motivations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Stakeholder Participation Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Managing the Consensus-building Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Staffing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Facilitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Ground Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
First Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Conduct of Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Working Groups and Committee Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
The Mix of Stakeholders in Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Self-organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Strategies for Reaching Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Duration of the Consensus-building Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Regional Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Formal Products of the Consensus Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Participants’ Assessment of Consensus Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Summary of Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Discussion and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
The Creation of Social, Intellectual, and Political Capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Social Capital: Coordination Through Personal Relationships and the 
Building of Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
vi
Intellectual Capital: Coordination Through Shared Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Political Capital: Amassing the Power to Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
The Consequences of Consensus Building: A Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Institutional Context for Consensus Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Challenges and Next Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
A Framework for Consensus Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Implementation of Plans and Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
The Local Government Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Cost Effectiveness of Consensus Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Figures
1. Administrative Strategies for Interagency Coordination in Growth Management . 3
2. Techniques and Procedures for Coordination in Growth Management . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Incentives and Sanctions for Coordinating Growth Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. San Francisco Estuary Project: Organizational Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5. Santa Monica Bay Restoration Project: Organizational Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
Volume 2, Appendix: Case Studies
 1. Growth Management Consensus Project 
 2. Economic and Environmental Recovery Coalition 
 3. San Diego Regional Growth Management Strategy
 4. San Francisco Estuary Project
 5. Santa Monica Bay Restoration Project 
 6. Contra Costa County Measure C
 7. Natural Communities Conservation Planning 
 8. Coachella Valley Habitat Conservation Plan
 9. Bay Vision 2020
10. Regional Planning in Los Angeles
11. Playa Vista
12. Military Base Reuse Planning
vii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The purpose of this study was to determine whether and how consensus building is useful
for coordinating growth management. The study was devised to recommend to the California
Legislature principles for designing a growth management program for the state. The findings
outline the processes, the conditions, incentives and institutional settings in which consensus
building appears to be most effective.
We recommend that the state establish a framework within which consensus building can
and will be used as a primary method for developing policy on growth management. The task
is to institutionalize the flexibility, adaptiveness, and self-management of consensus building,
in order to create new norms of communication, interaction, and problem solving within a
political and organizational framework that will encourage collaborative discussion and choice
among the players in growth.
Defining the Problem and the Terms
Growth management refers to activities at all levels of government to guide the location,
density, timing, and character of growth. Its purposes include economic development,
infrastructure planning, assuring the provision of facilities needed in a region, as well as
protecting natural resources and open space. Growth management reflects a recognition that
land use patterns are significant for a wide range of statewide policy objectives.
Coordination is a central task because growth is influenced by many agencies, levels of
government, and private players. Power and responsibility for growth and the environment are
fragmented — shared among players who have conflicting objectives. Many of them cannot
succeed in meeting their own objectives without coordinating with others because their actions
are mutually interdependent.
Consensus building refers to long-term, face-to-face group processes that incorporate key
stakeholders, including representatives of public agencies, interest groups, and local
governments, in a search for common ground. The methods of discussion build on mediation
and negotiation techniques, but the consensus building we examined is broader and more
anticipatory than ordinary conflict resolution. The groups were called together to prepare
legislation, policies, plans, regulatory principles, and implementation strategies rather than
simply to resolve conflicts.
The Cases
We conducted 14 case studies of consensus-building efforts on growth management and
related issues around the state, selecting cases according to four main criteria: (1) consensus
building was central; (2) the problem or task cut across jurisdictional lines; (3) the duration
of the process was sufficient to allow assessment; (4) the cases were geographically dispersed,
north and south, urban and rural, and included the three largest metropolitan areas.
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For each case we developed a common interview guide and interviewed 10 to 25 of the
key participants, reviewed documents, and wrote an individual report (see Appendix). Study
findings were developed from these individual case reports.
Cases studied were: the Growth Management Consensus Project, and its successor, the
Economic and Environmental Recovery Coalition, which brought together stakeholders
representing the major statewide interests to develop consensus on growth management
legislation; the San Diego Regional Growth Management Strategy, which involved all the
cities and the county in that region; the San Francisco Estuary Project and Santa Monica Bay
Restoration Project, both five-year processes that brought together a wide array of state and
federal agencies, local governments, and private interests to develop a management plan for
the estuary and bay; the group that put together the successful Contra Costa County Measure
C of 1988, involving environmentalists, developers, and local government; the efforts to
develop consensus on the large-scale development project in Los Angeles known as Playa
Vista; Natural Communities Conservation Planning in southern California, which involved
the state Resources Agency, the California Department of Fish and Game, and the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service, as well as environmentalists, agricultural interests, developers, and local
government in an effort to prepare performance standards and guidelines to protect the coastal
sage-scrub area; a similar effort in the Coachella Valley; Bay Vision 2020, the Bay Area’s
effort to build consensus on regional growth management legislation; and the reuse planning
process for three military facilities, Mather Air Force Base, George Air Force Base, and Fort
Ord. We also reviewed, briefly, regional efforts in Los Angeles concerning air quality,
transportation, and growth management.
FINDINGS
 • Consensus building did not happen spontaneously. All the cases had either a legislative
mandate or committed leadership to start them off, along with incentives for key players
to seek agreement.
 • Groups were self-organizing, whether the consensus process was mandated by law or was
an ad hoc effort. The groups chose stakeholders; structured subcommittees; set ground
rules; framed the problem; and decided on tasks, procedures, and products.
 • Most groups tried to include all interested stakeholders to assure that the agreements could
be implemented.
 • Stakeholders came to the table and tried to reach agreement when the status quo had
become unsatisfactory and they became convinced they could not accomplish their goals
in other arenas, or when they became convinced they would have to participate to protect
their interests.
 • Participation and willingness to compromise were affected by members’ perceptions of
the likelihood that agreements would be implemented.
 • When parallel arenas were available for resolving the issues, the potential for agreement
was less.
 • Staff played crucial roles in each case, facilitating and managing the whole process, and
providing technical information.
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 • Consensus building takes substantial time — at least one year and as many as five in some
of our cases to reach agreement on a complex plan.
 • Consensus-building processes generally involved multiple committees, that formed and
reformed in response to issues that emerged.
 • Although the processes were highly conflictual at times, participants stayed involved, for
the most part. They expressed support for the consensus approach to the issues and
claimed to have learned a great deal.
 • Local government representatives had a difficult time participating effectively, except
where they were the principal players, as in San Diego. The reasons include limited staff
capacity, the diversity of the local interests they represented, and the differences between
elected officials and other players at the table.
 • There are tremendous differences across the state’s three largest metropolitan regions in
attitudes toward regionalism and in the experience of agencies and jurisdictions in
cooperating at the regional level.
 • In almost every case, agreements were reached on legislation, plans, policies, performance
and monitoring standards, or principles and guidelines for public agency action.
 • It remains too early to judge the outcomes of the processes in terms of actions carried out
as a direct result of formal agreements and plans, except in the Coachella Valley, where
a number of actions have resulted.
 • New consensus groups have been created in some cases to work out the implementation
of plans. These continuing efforts are among the products of consensus building.
Social, Intellectual, and Political Capital
Formally agreed-upon plans and policies were not the most important result of consensus
building, nor its primary way of achieving coordination. Consensus building creates among
the participants three types of shared capital — social, intellectual, and political — each of
which plays a crucial part in coordination. Social capital, in the form of trust, norms of
behavior, and networks of communication, creates the potential for serious discussion to take
place among otherwise conflicting stakeholders. Intellectual capital, in the form of agreed
upon facts, shared problem definitions, and mutual understandings, not only provides a
common basis for discussion and moves the players toward agreement on policy issues, but
allows them to use this shared information to coordinate many of their actions. Political
capital, in the form of alliances and agreements on proposals that provide mutual gain, creates
the possibility that proposals will be adopted and implemented. These can be thought of as
capital because they represent value that grows as it is used. This capital lives on among
participants even after the group disbands, and it helps to institutionalize coordinated action
in the long run.
The Consequences of Consensus Building
Consensus-building processes had the following results: 
 • Plans, strategies, legislative proposals, and ballot measures were produced that were
supported by many, if not most, important stakeholders. Each of these in itself is a
coordination tool.
x • Consensus was reached on information describing the issues, on indicators for monitoring
and assessment, or on scientific principles for environmental management. Stakeholders
began to operate with the same information and criteria.
 • Stakeholders formerly in conflict developed lines of communication and some degree of
mutual understanding, trust, and capacity to work together constructively. They learned
how their actions affected one another. They developed less stereotyped and less
adversarial views of one another.
 • New personal networks among stakeholders were created that assist their organizations
to coordinate actions. These become flexible linkages across agencies, levels of
government, and the private sector, which allow for rapid response to issues.
 • Stakeholders affected by the issues, but not previously involved in public discussions,
were brought into the processes and learned how proposals would affect them. Coordina-
tion was thus extended to more players, and actions were based on a broader set of
perspectives.
 • Stakeholders gained new and largely shared understandings of the problems and their
causes and consequences.
 • Stakeholder’s organizations changed their actions, positions, and policies, moving closer
to each other as a result of their representative's learning during consensus building.
 • Some processes resulted in a shared understanding of how all members play a part in a
common economic or ecological system.
 • Participation has changed the practices of the members, many of whom have begun to use
consensus building in their other work. The result is to reduce conflict and help to build
a culture of collaboration among these agencies and interests.
These effects occurred in some, but not all, cases. Many conditions in the institutional
context were important to the success of an effort, as was the design and management of the
process itself.
Challenges and Next Steps: a Framework for
Consensus Building in California
Consensus building is a powerful tool for coordinating and reaching agreement in complex
and controversial multi-issue, multiplayer growth management tasks. Collaboration, mutual
learning, and problem solving through discourse permit the creation of formal and informal
networks to shape policy in new ways. The most effective of consensus building processes
institutionalize new modes of acting by creating social, intellectual, and political capital.
Although consensus building is time consuming, it will save resources overall. The combined
cost to public and private players of reaching agreements through consensus processes is
likely to be less by an order of magnitude than the costs of litigation, delayed projects, and the
cleanup of environments not protected. Consensus building encourages many types of
coordination and mutual adjustment in the shared power context in which growth occurs. 
We believe the State of California should give a central place in any growth management
program to consensus building. To accomplish this the state will have to create a flexible
framework and incentive structure within which consensus building can be done. These cases
show that one of the principal challenges is to assure the willing and active engagement of
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local governments in designing and implementing growth management. Their knowledge of
how regulation and public investment play out on the ground, their control of land use, and
their key role in implementing growth management make it essential that they come to the
table and stay until agreements are reached. Yet, local governments were not major players
in many of the cases we studied, so support and incentives for their participation will be
needed.
The findings suggest a number of delicate balances that must be achieved to design a
framework for consensus building:
 • Participants in a consensus process need assurance that their labors will be taken seriously
by decision makers, but the legislature or public agencies cannot commit themselves ahead
of time to an idea or program they have not seen.
 • Consensus building cannot work effectively if the issues are being fought out in multiple
arenas simultaneously. Players need to believe the consensus process is the place where
they must bring their concerns. On the other hand, the other institutions of government,
the courts and the legislatures, are the locales for legitimate decision-making.
 • Successful consensus building must be, to a great extent, self-organized and “owned” by
the participants, but vast amounts of energy of leading citizens will be wasted if each
group must learn from scratch the best ways to do things.
 • Although self-organized processes across the state will be different in their structure,
activities, and participants, there is a need to assure some consistency and fairness in the
application of policy statewide.
 • Consensus processes require time, and the amount will vary depending on the social,
intellectual, and political capital the participants have already developed. But these
processes also need closure and deadlines. The task will be to develop a framework that
allows the right balance for each process within the deadline.
 • Inclusion of all key stakeholders is important to assure that essential knowledge is
included in the discussion, as well as to assure political support for proposals, but
intransigent stakeholders can prevent agreement and drive away participants.
 • Inclusiveness can lead to unwieldy, highly diverse groups in which deep discussion is
difficult. Subgroups that are less diverse and smaller can discuss issues with greater depth
and care. While such subgroups seem essential for the success of these processes,
especially where they deal with highly technical or complex problems, there is no
guarantee of support in the larger group for agreements reached in the small ones.
 • Deep involvement by individual representatives is needed, but their level of understanding
and commitment are often difficult to translate back to the stakeholder organization.
 • Staff are necessary to consensus processes and they must be trusted equally by all
participants, but the most cost-effective strategy has been to borrow staff from one or more
of the participants. While fundraising can be done to pay for staff who are dedicated to the
process, this is time consuming and not always feasible.
 • Staff leadership and creative energy are essential to successful consensus building, but too
much staff guidance can hinder the important sense of group “ownership” of the process.
 • Formal sanctions and incentives to implement plans and policies are important to give
them credibility, but might well be insufficient to assure implementation. Highly specific
plans with strong sanctions imbedded in them are difficult to agree upon and may well
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have undesirable unforeseen consequences. Thus, consensus building continues to have
important functions throughout implementation.
RECOMMENDATIONS
State legislation should be designed to make consensus building an integral part of the
development of growth management policies, plans, and implementation strategies.
Consensus building plays an important role in coordinating growth management and
potentially reduces costly conflicts. In so doing it permits the development and implementa-
tion of coherent policy in this complex arena.
The state should establish and coordinate its own policies and programs related to growth
and the environment.
A principal obstacle to coordination at all levels is the conflicting messages and mandates
that come from different state agencies. Experience elsewhere demonstrates that at least a few
goals and broad principles at the state level are necessary to provide a framework for more
specific plans by state agencies and regions and to establish criteria for resolving conflicts in
agency missions.
California should establish a state-level council, made up of agency directors, to set goals
and priorities and coordinate state policies. This body should work with regional coordinating
groups to develop consensually agreed-upon state strategy.
This study shows that state agencies can achieve agreements among themselves and with
other participants in consensus-building processes. In states where growth management
programs have not included a responsible state council or commission, the legislature
regularly has to prepare annual legislation to fill in gaps or correct initial programs, and
regional players lack guidance. Such a council, along with regional goals, priorities, and
policies, can provide the flexible and adaptive institutional framework that is needed to
manage growth through consensus building. The social, intellectual, and political capital that
are essential for institutionalizing long-term collaborative relationships depend on a consistent
framework of expectations and processes that can be provided by a state council.
Regional coordination and planning must be central to any growth management program.
Growth management must have a regional focus. It is at the regional level where
growth-related activities exert their effects. Metropolitan economies are regional in character,
as are the activities of residents. Within regions are players with both the knowledge and the
motivation to plan and implement growth management in consensually agreed-upon ways.
The state should create strong incentives for regions to organize and for localities to join
regional coordinating bodies and reach agreements. A primary incentive would be the
requirement that state agencies follow regionally developed strategies that are consistent with
state goals, priorities, and performance standards.
Local governments should be offered at least two powerful incentives to cooperate with
each other in the region. The state should make infrastructure funding contingent upon
cooperation. It should also offer regions where there is cooperation the chance to influence
state investment and regulatory decisions. Changes are also needed, however, in the fiscal
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incentives and revenue-raising opportunities of local governments, which now discourage
intergovernmental cooperation and encourage these governments to permit environmentally
damaging forms of development. Incentives are likely to be more acceptable politically than
sanctions for failures to cooperate. A regional strategy should be adopted consensually, with
agreement of most jurisdictions within the region. Since the strategy will cover many issues
and involve the distribution of both benefits and costs among localities, reaching agreement
is feasible because many tradeoffs can be made. A region that does not adopt a growth
management strategy of its own after two to five years could be subject to the state council's
preparation of a strategy for the region.
Regions should organize themselves, and establish consensually their own boundaries,
institutional and interagency relationships, and committee structures and powers.
As each region has a unique history and experience, and a unique distribution of
responsibilities among its public agencies, participants must “own” their processes and design
them to suit their own conditions and problems. Some regions already have the basis for
cooperation in place. Some can involve a single county or COG. Others may require a system
of subregions. No one-size-fits-all regional structure is appropriate for all regions in the state.
Moreover, the structure of the regional coordinating group and its subgroups probably should
evolve over time to adapt to emerging issues and problems.
The state council should negotiate with each region to establish tasks and timelines, so
that the differences among regions, the magnitude of their tasks, and the work they have
already done can be taken into account.
These tasks should be simply defined, leaving the details to be worked out at the regional
level. Deadlines should depend on the scale and controversy of the tasks. It may be
appropriate to establish statewide performance standards with interim targets suitable to
different regions.
The state council should negotiate performance standards, guidelines, or implementation
strategies in a consensus-building way with regional bodies that have adopted regional
coordination strategies and plans.
These specifics of implementation may be more contentious than the setting of broad
policy. Negotiation and consensus building in establishing standards and guidelines will
anticipate or avoid many conflicts and assure that they take into account the diversity and
unique characteristics of the different parts of this vast state. This negotiation will help assure
support and implementation of state policy and objectives. The right to sit at the table with
state agency heads can become a substantial incentive for the regions to organize themselves
and for localities to cooperate in a regional context.
The state council and regional coordinating body should be designated as the primary
arenas for discussion. Where differences cannot be resolved within the region, mediation and
conflict resolution services should be made available. Procedures should be established for
appealing decisions of the regional consensus group at the state level, possibly to the state
council or a designated hearing board.
Our cases show that where there are multiple arenas for decision-making or substantial
ambiguity about how and where decisions will be made, consensus building is undermined.
Stakeholders leave the table or have little incentive to make difficult choices. Insofar as is
legally possible, state agencies should refrain from making decisions on issues while they are
under consideration in regional arenas and should indicate to participants that their decisions
     1 In New Jersey, an impact assessment of the consensually adopted state plan found that $400 million would
be saved annually by municipalities and school districts alone, $65 million per year would be saved in capital
infrastructure costs statewide, and air and water pollution would be significantly lower than without the plan.
(New Jersey Office of State Planning, and Rutgers University Center for Urban Policy Research, Impact
Assessment of the New Jersey Interim State Development and Redevelopment Plan, February 1992.)
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will be respected if they are congruent with agencies’ missions. In some cases the missions
of state agencies may need to be changed to require them to consider growth management
concerns in their decision-making. Mediation services, offered either through the state or
drawing on the growing body of mediation professionals in the private and nonprofit sectors,
can reduce the need for expensive and formal legal proceedings and appeals.
The state should provide funding to staff the regional consensus-building efforts.
Consensus-building processes will require technical, clerical, and administrative support,
as well as support for professional facilitators to assist with particularly difficult tasks. The
cost of staffing these processes is minor compared to the costs of conflict and failures to
coordinate, which the state currently confronts. As these staff must be regarded as unbiased,
the funding should not be controlled by an agency with growth management interests or one
that is viewed as politically partisan.1
The state should cooperate with regions in building a shared information base to support
consensus building.
Consensually agreed-upon technical information can play a significant role in coordination
and can become shared intellectual capital for all participants. This can occur not only within
regional consensus processes, but also between regions and the state.
The state should provide financial support to local governments so they can take
leadership roles in the regional consensus processes.
The willing and effective involvement of local governments in regional consensus building
is crucial to the success of growth management, but the costs of participation are now high for
them and the benefits uncertain. To participate at all, much less to take leadership roles, local
governments need to believe they can adequately represent their interests, and therefore need
to dedicate staff time to participation, as well as preparing technical analyses and proposals.
Because of the budget crisis and their need to deal with such fundamental issues as public
safety, local governments have little staff to devote to such activities.
The state should provide training and other forms of direct technical assistance to those
involved in consensus building.
Meetings of public bodies, city councils, and commissions have followed formalized
procedures that regulate debate over differences. Consensus building, in contrast, requires
listening, cooperating with opponents, and looking for common ground. These methods can
be taught through workshops to group leaders, who in turn teach their colleagues. The state
could designate the task to university mediation groups, professional mediators in the private
sector, or a state office. This is a low-cost activity that promises substantial benefits over time.
Once regional strategies are developed, localities can make necessary changes in their
plans to make them consistent with regional strategies. A properly designed incentive structure
can assure that localities have an interest in preparing plans that are consistent with regional
strategies and state policies — and may be the most effective way of assuring local
cooperation.
xv
To require local plans to be consistent with state or regional plans, and detailed,
centralized review of these plans, is both inefficient and politically unpopular. From
experience in other states, such as Florida or Maine, it is not even clear that such requirements
provide an effective way to coordinate local and regional actions, nor that plan consistency
can be unambiguously determined. The regional consensus group should identify its own
enforcement and compliance mechanisms for members. This type of self-policing is most
likely to be effective. In any case, a locality or region would not receive state funding for
transportation, infrastructure, schools, or other activities if they were inconsistent with state
goals, priorities, and standards, and with the regional strategy. This in itself is likely to give
localities the incentive to make plans congruent with regional strategy. The state should
explore various strategies for assuring consistency of local plans and proposals with state and
regional policy, including providing standing to certain interests and agencies to challenge the
plans and proposals, as well as using a voluntary certification process whereby a “certified”
plan would not be subject to such challenge. This is a complex matter which we believe
should be worked out over time in the process of implementing growth management.

      See Innes, 1992b.2
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study was to discover whether consensus building can be an
effective method for achieving the coordination needed for managing growth in California. If
so, we sought to learn how consensus building accomplishes this task, and what are the
conditions for it to be effective. Our objective was to make recommendations to the legislature
on the design of state growth management policies, processes, and organizational structures.
To answer these questions we evaluated 14 cases of major consensus-building efforts
for growth management and related purposes in California. We found strong evidence that
consensus building is a significant and useful tool for coordination, not only because it helps
key participants in the growth process reach agreements on action but, even more importantly,
because it helps them to build shared social, intellectual, and political capital. This set of social
relationships and trust, agreed-upon data and understandings of the issues, and political
alliances is the basis for long-term coordination. A comparison of the cases, along with a
review of the literature on consensus building and dispute resolution, shows that consen-
sus-building processes must be self-organized by participants, to some degree, but they also
depend on support from the institutions of government. Groups need time, staffing, incentives
for participation, and confidence that their efforts will have some results. 
Defining the Problem
Growth management refers to a broad range of governmental efforts to influence the
locational patterns, density, timing and type of growth and development in an area, not simply
to efforts to stop or slow growth. Its purposes are many, including encouraging economic
development, maximizing the value of infrastructure investments, providing certainty for the
private sector to do business, assuring the provision of such regionally needed facilities as
public transit or waste treatment, avoiding wasteful competition among communities for
infrastructure funding or development opportunities, and providing affordable housing as well
as protecting natural resources, open space, and valuable environments and ecosystems.
Growth management, in great part, is concerned with efficient use of public resources. It
reflects the recognition that some patterns of growth are wasteful, and that land use patterns
are significant for a wide range of statewide policy objectives. These patterns need explicit
attention if the state is to implement its broad policy agenda.
The task of growth management is largely one of coordination.  That is, a principal goal2
is to bring the actions of many players into some common order and to make these actions
      Innes, 1992a.3
      We use this term to mean anyone with a stake in the outcomes, from those who stand to gain or lose directly,4
to public participants whose values are affected by a project. For the purposes of these processes, stakeholders
represent organized interests, groups, agencies, or other organizations, rather than individuals representing
themselves.
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work effectively as a system. A study of recent statewide growth management legislation3
shows that most of the statutes make coordination a central objective. Public officials and the
populace increasingly recognize that sprawling and inefficient patterns of growth are due to
fragmentation of responsibility among public agencies, which makes it difficult to manage
resources, protect quality of life, and provide for social equity or balance among environmental
and economic objectives. Uncoordinated action amounts to no policy, at best, and to expensive
and even paralyzing conflicts, at worst. Coordination is a prerequisite to an effective policy
for growth because the actions of various agencies and private players are so interdependent.
The growth process entails many interdependencies. The top-down pursuit of narrow
missions of public agencies to protect air quality or build highways comes into conflict with
the reality that economic development and resource protection depend on many factors
working together in a region. State and federal agencies both influence and respond to the
patterns and timing of development by providing infrastructure and other growth-inducing
investment, and establishing regulations to protect specific resources such as air or water.
Local governments control land use, but, in doing so, react to the demands and constraints
created by these investment decisions. Local land use plans in turn may increase the
development pressure to which state and federal agencies respond. A local government’s fiscal
condition is in part contingent on its neighbor’s land use decisions, because these can preempt
its own ability to attract revenue-generating uses. Many private and public interest groups also
influence local, state, and federal decisions, either through elected bodies or by challenging
decisions in the courts. Any effort to manage growth or establish implementable policy
requires the knowledge and, ultimately, the assent (or coercion) of many, if not all, of these
players.
Many strategies for coordination exist for such multiagency, multijurisdictional tasks,
and each has its own strengths and limitations. These range from centralized administrative
strategies like consolidating agencies or making strict rules and implementing them through
bureaucratic controls, to employing flexible linkage techniques such as sharing information
across agencies, using informal networks among players, or to self-enforcing methods such
as giving interested parties the right to sue to enforce adherence to common policies. An
inventory of administrative strategies that have been used to coordinate growth management
is given in Figure 1. Figure 2 details a number of more specific tools, such as requiring players
to adhere to common goals or to create plans that are consistent with one another.
The term consensus building refers to group processes that typically incorporate many
stakeholders  and involve a search for common ground and broad agreement (but not4
necessarily unanimity) through long-term, intensive discussions. The methods of communi-
cation often build on mediation and negotiation techniques, and on experience in disputes over
3Figure 1
ADMINISTRATIVE STRATEGIES FOR INTERAGENCY
COORDINATION IN GROWTH MANAGEMENT
Consolidation Combining of agencies with growth-related responsibilities into a superagency.
Coordination occurs because the superagency has authority over the others, a
mission which supersedes those of the separate agencies, and responsibility to assure
actions are coordinated. Example: Legislation proposed by Bay Vision 2020 to
consolidate ABAG, MTC and BAAQMD in the Bay Area.
Top Down Command and control by a central agency which has goals, policies or plans.
Coordination occurs by bureaucrats making implementing rules and judging the
consistency of plans, policies or actions of other agencies or local governments with
state policy. Example: Florida state growth management program.
Quasi-judicial Players are permitted to challenge plans or policies as inconsistent with goals or
policies of the state or region in quasi-judicial proceedings. Coordination occurs as
players voluntarily develop consistent plans and policies or after legal challenges and
court decisions that inconsistent plans must be altered. Some coordination may occur
through “voluntary” or mediated settlements, bypassing the litigation. Example:
Vermont state growth management.
Back and Forth Horizontal, collaborative interactions among all players. “Cross Acceptance.”
Coordination occurs during the process of designing and agreeing on plans, policies
or standards through consensus-building group process. Example: New Jersey state
planning program, interagency working groups.
Bottom Up Mutual adjustment process starting with smallest units of government. Coordination
occurs by getting localities and other agencies to make plans and identify and
mediate conflicts among themselves. Aggregation of these plans becomes the basis




Formal linkages across agencies requiring information exchange, consultation, and
review of plans, policies and actions. Coordination occurs because players have the
necessary knowledge of others’ actions to try stop them, alter them, or adjust their
own. Examples: environmental impact assessment, federal A-95 review.
Informal Net-
works
Personal contacts and regular communication among individuals in different agen-
cies and governments. Coordination occurs by incremental mutual adjustment as
these individuals influence the policies and actions of their agencies, usually during
the deliberation processes. Linkage may be horizontal across agency staff or pro-
vided by citizen watchdog or interest groups. Examples: Everywhere.
4Figure 2
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES FOR COORDINATION
IN GROWTH MANAGEMENT
Common Goals These may be mandated centrally by the state or region, or jointly
agreed. They may be broad or specific. They must be followed by all
players. Example: All state growth management programs.
Common Policies and
Standards 
These include policy principles such as encouraging mixed use
development, or preserving high quality agricultural land, or assuring
development does not exceed infrastructure capacity, (concurrency)
and standards like level of service for measuring that capacity. Exam-
ples: Several state growth management programs.
Common Procedures
and Criteria 
Standardized procedures, review criteria, regulatory practices. Exam-
ple: Streamlined permit processing.
Principles of Desired
Urban Form
Patterns of growth players agree to or are required to promote in their
plans, policies and actions, such as containment of development,
cluster patterns or growth along corridors as opposed to sprawling




Includes geographic information systems, population or economic
projections, traffic projections and models, environmental studies and
analyses which all players use in decisions and debates. Examples:
Everywhere.
Regulatory Maps Maps used by all players, designating areas and defining or limiting
actions that may be taken within them. Examples: zoning, plan maps.
Plan-making Require-
ments
All players are required to make formal, explicit plans, often follow-
ing standardized formats, covering specified issues. Often combined
with consistency requirements with other plans and other policies,
standards etc. Example: Florida state growth management.
Capital Budgeting
Linked to Land Use
Plans
Linking of capital budget planning at all levels to growth management
through comprehensive plans, infrastructure needs assessments, use
of common level of service standards etc. Examples: New Jersey state
planning, Orlando and the Florida Keys.
      Key references include Fisher and Ury (1981), Carpenter and Kennedy (1988), Susskind and Cruikshank5
(1987), Sullivan (1984), and Moore (1986).
      Innes (1992a and b), and Neuman (1993).6
       Dryzek’s book Discursive Democracy, 1990, elaborates this notion contending that a group process he calls7
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facility siting, environmental regulation, and community conflict.  In  mediation and negotia-5
tion the objective is to resolve a specific problem that has turned into a conflict. We are
interested here, however, in consensus building for broader and more anticipatory tasks. While
the experience of consensus building in focused disputes is helpful (these disputes typically
raise broad issues linking the solution to a variety of policies and actions), consensus building
in the present study involves the framing of public issues, developing agreement on facts, and
then setting desired policy directions, developing plans, regulatory principles, and even
implementation strategies.
The idea of consensus building as a coordination strategy has been little recognized in the
legislation or the literature to this point. Our previous research, however, shows that these
group processes have been used in practice because the other tools are insufficient.   The6
“Back and Forth” model in Figure 1 represents the consensus building approach on which we
have focused. Consensus building groups have been invented in other states to supplement
growth management programs designed basically to be top-down bureaucratic approaches or
laissez-faire or bottom-up models. Some states, like New Jersey, have relied fundamentally
on consensus processes as their central tool. These group processes — task forces, working
groups, commissions, and so on — did a variety of tasks that had often proved otherwise
intractable, from setting policy to designing plans to problem solving, fact finding, or
designing procedures or performance standards. 
There are theoretical reasons to predict that face-to-face consensus-building processes will
be important coordination tools in tasks like growth management. Thompson (1967)
distinguishes among three different kinds of tasks that each require a different strategy for
achieving coordination. Where tasks are well understood and repetitive, coordination can be
done through standardization of practice (regulation). Where the outputs of one part of a
system are inputs to another, an effective method of coordination is requiring that plans be
consistent with one another. Where outputs of one part of a system are inputs to another and
vice versa, then mutual adjustment is needed among players. Growth management clearly falls
into this last category, and consensus building involving face-to-face meetings among the
many players is a way of achieving the needed mutual adjustment.
Dryzek (1987) has argued that standard administrative practices have not successfully
managed the complexity and the uncertainty involved in environmental management. He
shows how and why market systems, administered systems, polyarchy, and other systems for
social choice have failed to protect ecological systems. Group processes involving the
knowledgeable actors, he argues (1990), have more potential for addressing a wider range of
concerns and complex interactions than standard, top-down bureaucratic approaches, as well
as a greater capacity to develop solutions tailored to the uncertain and unique contexts of
particular regions.7
communicative action, which is much like the model of consensus building we describe here, is a more effective
and democratic strategy for environmental management.
      We found only one major consensus building project that had been going on long enough to be in the8
implementation stage, so we did not have the option of evaluating consensus building by the actions it produced.
       We were fortunate in being able to conduct several case studies under the auspices of the project, with partial9
support from other sources, and with research associates’ time contributed as they completed theses and
coursework. These included the Santa Monica study, the Natural Communities and Coachella Valley cases, and
the military base cases. This allowed us to complete far more research than the project funding allowed. All but
the base closure cases were conducted according to our own standard methodology described below. The base
closure cases were completed before our study, and independently of it. They involved a less systematic inquiry,
less focused on consensus building. However, they offered sufficient overlap with our study that one of the
authors (Kirschenbaum) has rewritten them for this project. The more complete version of that study appears in
War Games: Evaluating the California Military Base Conversion Process, by Joshua Kirschenbaum and Dwayne
6
Incentives, Sanctions, and Institutional Framework
Consensus building among players with strong interests and much at stake does not occur
unless the conditions are right. Incentives and sanctions bring players to the table and keep
them there. We have identified a range of sanctions and incentives that have been used in other
states to encourage coordination in growth management, and some of these provide incentives
for consensus building (see Figure 3).
The existence of alternative opportunities for action can undermine consensus building,
as players will engage in it seriously only if they perceive that reaching agreement is preferable
to working independently for their goals. They must believe that their participation in the
process will be worthwhile and that what is concluded may actually be implemented. Thus,
the institutional setting and the legislative framework can encourage or discourage consensus
building. The linkage of these processes to the duly constituted public decision making bodies
is also important because it determines whether the results will be significant. The purpose of
this study is to help identify institutional frameworks that enable and support successful
consensus building, rather than hinder it, as has been the norm.
Methodology
The complexity of consensus building and of the conditions that affect its success or
failure demanded a qualitative, holistic approach to the research. We have examined
significant and visible cases in California where some form of consensus building has been
attempted in growth management or related issues, including environmental management and
military base reuse planning. Thus we believe that our findings will have value not only to
growth management legislation, but also to a variety of other state initiatives requiring
coordination of complex multi-issue, multijurisdictional tasks.
We had four criteria for case selection: (1) consensus building was central to the effort to
coordinate; (2) the problem or task cut across jurisdictional boundaries and involved multiple
issues and multiple players; (3) the effort had been going on long enough so that we could
assess, to some degree, its consequences;  (4) cases from the three largest metropolitan regions8
of the state and from central California were included.  9

S. Marsh (Working Paper 603, Institute of Urban and Regional Development, University of California at
Berkeley, December 1993). 
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For each of our cases, we interviewed staff and participants who had been deeply
involved, reviewed memoranda, meeting minutes, analyses, and plans and policy documents,
and attended meetings as timing permitted. We interviewed between 10 and 25 people for each
case, trying to get as broad a range of perspectives as possible and to account for the
complexity of the case. We always interviewed key staff and most of the players identified by
staff or others as important participants, representing major diverging perspectives. Due to
limits of time and funding we could not interview as many players as we would have liked,
so we inevitably missed nuances and some perspectives. Moreover, we were seldom able to
follow up on participants who had left the processes, so our understanding of dissatisfactions
with the processes is, to some degree, limited.
We focused on getting an accurate history of events, disputes and agreements, and a clear
understanding of processes used for discussion and reaching consensus. We identified the
legislative and regulatory framework along with the decision making bodies and agencies with
responsibility for addressing the problems. We sought to find out why players came to the
table and stayed there (or in some cases left). We wanted to know what changes, if any,
occurred in players’ understandings, positions, and activities or those of the groups they
represented, during the course of the process. We inquired how they reached agreement on any
policies, information, or other outcomes.
We used a common interview guide developed collaboratively by Gruber, Innes, Neuman,
and Thompson. The group also collectively reviewed preliminary findings from each case,
identified questions for further exploration, and compared the cases. Thus, both the design of
the inquiry and the interpretation of findings were done collectively. In some cases interviews
were done by two group members, and in other cases by just one of the team. The case studies
were drafted by individuals noted as authors for each, and reviewed by the rest of the group.
Each casewas also sent out for review and comment by several key players and staff to check 
on the accuracy of facts and to correct misinterpretations. Comments were used to revise the
cases. Every effort has been made to present facts accurately. We have noted where there were
differences among the stories and perceptions of respondents. Ultimately, we have offered our
own ways of making sense of differing views.
The team did cross-case comparisons and prepared findings and recommendations
qualitatively, on the basis of the preponderance of evidence. The diversity of the cases
provides a broad base for comparison, but the numbers are not sufficient to offer meaningful
statistics or quantitative conclusions. The report itself was outlined by the team and written
by Innes and Gruber, with review and editing by Neuman and Thompson.
9THE CASES
The full case studies are included in the Appendix. A brief synopsis of each is provided
here. As the planning process in some of these communities extended beyond the period
covered by our research, developments that have occurred since mid-1993 may not be reflected
in the text.
The Growth Management Consensus Project was a statewide effort to bring together
governments and interest group stakeholders to develop agreement on statewide legislation for
growth management. Its successor, the Economic and Environmental Recovery Coalition,
continued the work and focused on drafting actual legislation in a smaller and less contentious
group. Although no legislation has passed, agreement has been reached on significant
components among players who were formerly in substantial conflict. These two related cases
allowed us to see what the issues in growth management are for the major interest groups in
the state, and to understand what they have been able to agree on and what sticking points
remain. The cases also provided insight into the detailed processes and discussions that led to
agreements, and to understanding the skills and tasks of a facilitator for this type of consensus
building.
The one metropolitan effort that has produced a regional growth management plan, the
San Diego Regional Growth Management Strategy, was created in response to passage of
Measure C in San Diego County in 1988, calling for the formulation of such a plan. It involved
a collaborative effort of the county’s 18 cities and the county government, working under the
auspices of the San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG), to develop a regional
growth strategy on a consensual basis. This case stood out in that local governments took the
leading role and were able to reach substantial consensus. A draft strategy was produced and
work continues on more detailed planning and implementation.
The San Francisco Estuary Project and its parallel, the Santa Monica Bay Restoration
Project, formed a natural pair to examine. These massive consensus projects, conducted under
the auspices of the federal Clean Water Act, brought together representatives of the federal,
state, and local agencies whose actions affect major estuaries. The projects also included key
private interests, such as environmental and business groups. Their purpose was to develop
an assessment of the state of the estuary and prepare and consensually adopt a conservation
and management plan for it. Like San Diego’s, these cases involved a central consensus group
and multiple issue-based groups, along with technical and public advisory committees.
Although the primary focus is on water quality, land use and growth issues are integral to
estuarine problems. Both these projects involved many of the same players and agencies that
would be involved in implementing a regional growth plan. The advantage of examining two
estuary projects was that there were enough similarities in structure and purposes that the
differences could be particularly informative. These two cases also permitted us to examine
10
the role of technical information in consensus building, because the scientific characterization
of the estuary and assessment of the scientific findings were central to each case. Both have
produced a consensual management plan, along with a set of water quality indicators and
scientific data about the status of the bay/estuary. Although implementation of the plans
depends on the political will of the governor and on funding, the indicators the projects
produced are already in use by regulators, with the effect of redirecting some priorities to the
protection of water quality.
We also studied the consensus process that led to Contra Costa County Measure C in
1988. This was a self-organized collaboration of development and environmental interests,
along with local officials and citizens, designed to prepare and pass a referendum for a sales
tax that would support county transportation improvements. Measure C also included a
provision for growth management and a companion bond issue for open space. The county is
highly diverse economically and racially and is split into subsections (or regions, as they call
them), which see their interests very differently. Thus the effort to bring both regions and
interests together for this purpose is particularly instructive. 
The Natural Communities Conservation Planning case in southern California was a
natural choice because it is a major, precedent-setting effort by state agencies to be proactive
and coordinate state, federal, and local conservation planning, while working with
environmentalists and developers. Moreover, the area in question, the coastal sage-scrub
habitat of the gnatcatcher and other rare species, covers portions of three counties and is under
intense development pressure. The planning area involved approximately 6,000 square miles.
The idea that united all the players was dislike of the species-by-species protection approach
of the Endangered Species Act. They all saw potential benefits and greater certainty in a
broader “natural communities” approach to wildlife protection. The state followed a three-step
approach: first, at the regional level, stakeholders worked to reach consensus on guidelines and
performance standards; second, state and federal agencies negotiated planning agreements with
local governments on how subregional plans would meet these guidelines; and third, the
stakeholders are now participating in the development of the subregional conservation plans.
This case is unusual in our sample because state agencies took the lead. It is interesting
because substantial agreement has been reached among players who have long been in conflict.
One of its most effective methods was its reliance on a panel of scientific experts who were
all acceptable to the stakeholders. The case presented here examines the first stage of this
conservation planning process, which has reached completion.
The Coachella Valley case allowed us to look not only at the planning process but also
at the implementation of a habitat conservation plan that had been developed consensually.
This case allowed us not only to see how 14 local jurisdictions, the Bureau of Land
Management, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the California Department of Fish and
Game, local developers, and environmentalists managed to agree on a coordinated solution to
the conflict between endangered species protection and development objectives, it also enabled
us to see how consensus building played a part in implementation.
Bay Vision 2020 was the major consensus-building effort in the San Francisco Bay Area
to establish a regional growth policy and strategy. The commission drew its membership from
a diverse group of leading citizens, most of whom had no growth management responsibilities.
      Due to limitations of funding we were unable to do more than one or two interviews on these and to review10
documentary material.
      The Natomas project in the Sacramento area was an example of a complex development that was11
successfully negotiated through a consensus process after years of stalemate (see Michael Peter Smith), but many
others remain in difficulty (Huntington Beach, Bolsa Chica, etc.).
      These studies were done independently of this project by Joshua Kirschenbaum and Dwayne March (op.12
cit.), so they did not adhere to all the common questions and methods used here. The methods of interviewing
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They were chosen for their diversity and personal qualities rather than as stakeholders
representing identified interests. The commission was not sponsored officially by any
governmental agency, but rather by a voluntary group including key stakeholders in growth
— the largest environmental group in the region, the most important business research
organization, and a group of regionally minded locally elected officials. The purpose of
establishing the commission was to educate these leading citizens and find a consensus among
them about the nature of the regional growth management problem, and the need and direction
for action. Then a small group — The Bay Vision Action Coalition, made up largely of the
stakeholders who had sponsored the commission — used its findings and recommendations
as the basis for drafting legislation for regional planning and governance. The proposal, to
consolidate three major regional agencies and create a regional commission, turned out to be
controversial, and was strongly opposed by many local governments in the region.
We briefly reviewed the equivalent effort in the Los Angeles region, the LA 2000
Committee and Partnership, which involved an elite group of powerful business, environmen-
tal, and community leaders in developing a vision first for the city, and then for the region. We
also briefly examined the variety of regional bodies doing some type of growth-related
planning for the Los Angeles area.  We combined these into a single discussion of the Los10
Angeles situation, exploring the inherent obstacles to creating a regional coordinating effort
in an area that is so large and has so many strong, independent, and often competing agencies
with no mandate or incentive to cooperate with one another.
Playa Vista is a massive development proposed for an area of Los Angeles sandwiched
between middle-class residential districts near Marina del Rey. The project lies within the
jurisdictions of Los Angeles city and county and the Coastal Zone Management Commission.
It raises issues of wetlands, traffic impacts, and views, to name only a few. It has been debated
for more than a dozen years, and repeatedly revised to suit its critics. As yet, building has not
begun, though in the summer of 1993 many former opponents began to support the project and
permits were given for the first phase. One city council member lost her re-election bid over
the project, and it became a citywide cause célèbre. This project is our only example of a
consensus-building effort around a development project, as most such projects do not meet our
criterion of crossing jurisdictional lines. This case, however, turned out not to have a11 
face-to-face group process with all stakeholders involved simultaneously, but rather employed
shuttle diplomacy by the developer among the interests and agencies.
Finally, military base reuse planning at Fort Ord, George Air Force Base, and Mather
Air Force Base allowed us to examine attempts at interjurisdictional consensus building
concerning redevelopment and base reuse planning.  These have been largely failed attempts12 13
and the review of materials were similar, however, and they addressed a number of the same issues.
      Fort Ord has had some success since the preparation of this case, and planning seems to be moving ahead.13
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thus far, although some have been more successful than others. They allow us to look at the
issue of who convenes the consensus process, and at the problem created when some
stakeholders have substantially more to gain or lose than others and thus do not accept a
consensus process that does not recognize their special concerns. These cases cover only some
aspects of our inquiry, as they were done independently of our project. We include them
because they provide substantial parallels and insights for the present project.
      These include the Growth Management Consensus Project, the Economic and Environmental Recovery14
Coalition, San Diego, Natural Communities Conservation Planning, the Santa Monica Bay Restoration Project,




Of the nine cases of consensus building that we examined in detail,  four had as a primary14
purpose preparing or working toward legislation, four aimed primarily at preparing a plan, and
one focused on developing specific actions. Seven of the nine were preceded by an earlier
working group that had set up the process.
All but two of the cases relied on subgroups in addition to a central committee. The size
of that central group ranged from seven in one case to 54 for the largest group. Six ranged
between 15 and 35 members. Four of the cases used technical advisory committees and two
used special-purpose technical committees. Three set up issue-based committees, one used
regional committees, and almost all used ad hoc short-term subcommittees at one time or
another. These committees were all made up of diverse stakeholders, except in one case where
“caucus” groups of similar stakeholders were created. Two cases had a higher-level
“sponsoring” committee above the central committee.
The shortest process we examined took about eight months, and another took less than
a year. The others ranged from a year and a half to five or six years. The shortest ones were
regarded as incomplete, and other groups took up the work after the process we examined had
ended. Two of the processes are continuing at this writing. At least four of the cases resulted
in the creation of new consensus groups to follow up the work of the first group. (It is difficult,
at times, to be certain if a new group is really continuing the work.) In at least four cases, other
parallel or spinoff consensus groups were created outside the process to work on aspects of the
issues.
Staff were provided in a variety of ways. In four cases the consensus-building group itself
hired and paid at least some of the staff. Staff were also borrowed from state agencies (one
case), the legislature (two), federal agencies (one), COGs, or councils of government (two),
nonprofits (one), or local government (one). In two cases a developer provided staff. In several
others, the group hired consultants to do special tasks. Most cases had a mixture of staff
provided in different ways. The funding also came in different ways, with three groups raising
their own funding from public agencies, foundations, and private interest groups. The EPA
provided the funding for the two estuary projects, and a developer provided funding in another
case. Typically, public agencies loaned their staff without charge to the groups.
The combination of stakeholders varied by group. At least four groups included almost
a full range of possible stakeholder types, from state and federal agencies, local governments,
      See Susan Sherry (1993).15
14
and interest groups. Three others included no state or federal agencies, while one had a central
committee made up entirely of local officials. Only two included social equity stakeholders,
who are not normally part of the growth management debates.  These were representatives15
of the poor or ethnic minority groups who would be affected, albeit often indirectly, by growth
management policies.
In at least five cases major parallel activities were taking place in other arenas, while in
four cases the consensus process was really the central location for discussion. Technical fact-
finding was a central feature in six cases, while only more-limited qualitative analyses were
done in the others. The products of the consensus efforts were so varied that they cannot be
summarized, but they included plans and legislation as well as indicators for monitoring
strategies, guidelines for planning, surveys, and emerging agreements. The degree of success
or failure of any one case cannot be simply measured, since all had some successes and all
failed to accomplish all that was originally intended.
Stakeholders
Selection Process
Stakeholders joined these processes in several different ways. In none of our cases was
membership predefined, although, in officially sanctioned governmental processes like San
Diego's or the estuary projects, some stakeholders were suggested by the legislation. In many
cases the players with the most at stake, often the initiators, selected themselves to start the
process. In some cases, like Bay Vision, Coachella Valley, or the Growth Management
Consensus Project, the initiators selected the group. Often a core group or project initiators
later decided other stakeholders were needed, as they did in the San Francisco Estuary Project.
They used personal and professional networks to identify individuals and active interest
groups. Organizations coordinating the process, like SANDAG, also might choose
stakeholders. Sometimes the organizers selected individuals who had good communication
skills and commitment to consensus; sometimes they asked organizations to designate an
individual to represent them; but often, especially in the early stages, the process involved the
joint selection of an interest and an individual who could represent that interest. Growth
Management Consensus Project staff, before inviting stakeholders to the table, “shopped their
list around” Sacramento to assure they had incorporated all key interests. Prior to the San
Francisco Estuary Project, public workshops were held to which a large number of likely
participants in the project were invited and educated on the issues. Typically, the core group
then moved to unite additional stakeholders soon after it began work. A public involvement
committee assisted in this selection process.
We observed a combination of formality and informality in the selection process. In the
interests of assuring that all who have power or major interest are represented, both self-
selection and deliberate efforts to involve stakeholders seemed to be needed. This lack of a
simple procedural rule or a priori set of members raised a dilemma of legitimacy for the
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process at times, though complaints only occurred in cases like the Economic and Environ-
mental Recovery Coalition, the Natural Communities Conservation Planning program
(NCCP), or San Francisco Estuary Project, where some interested stakeholders were left out.
In the NCCP, which had no method for limiting involvement, when more and more people
wanted to get involved they adopted a public hearing format.
Selection Criteria
Inclusiveness. Most groups sought to include all active interests with a stake in the issue,
recognizing the political importance of inclusion. In the words of one person involved in the
Contra Costa process, “If you had an issue on the sales tax measure, we wanted you in the
room. We wanted to get everyone in the room.” Many attribute the fact that so many groups
supported (or at least did not oppose) the Contra Costa measure to the inclusivity of the
process. Coachella Valley organizers followed a similar logic. In San Diego, the norm for all
committees was to be inclusive. For some committees this meant including representatives of
every jurisdiction within the county; for other committees it meant broadly representing
interests in the county. As one staff member described it, “we want to bring all affected people
into the tent.” He went on to explain that doing this made it easier to sell whatever product
resulted from the group.
Staff decided the Growth Management Consensus Project needed to include all interests
because they represented the legislature. However, they went beyond the obvious, active
interests to invite inner-city and community-based groups, which have not played much role
in growth politics and did not, at the outset, know what was at stake for them. Staff regarded
the education of all the stakeholders about the “social equity” issues in growth management
to be a major success of the project. With some success, The San Francisco Estuary Project,
through the public involvement committee, also attempted to bring in stakeholders who had
not previously played an active role in debates. Most groups did not go beyond seeking out the
interests that were already actively involved, and making sure none were missing.
If a missing stakeholder had the capacity to be a deal breaker, the problem could be
serious. The fact, for example, that local governments were missing from the Economic and
Environmental Recovery Coalition (EERC) raises problems both for passage of the legislation
and for effective implementation if passed. EERC efforts to represent local government
interests through informal consultation and indirect representation will help, but may be
insufficient to assure the support of local governments or to design a program that will work
at the local level.
Balance. A concern for balance often led to the creation of very large committees.
Although the literature on group process makes it clear that smaller groups (7 to 15) are most
effective for consensus-building discussion, many of the central committees in the processes
we studied became quite unwieldy, with as many as 54 people in one case and 30 to 45 in
others. These committees grew in size despite the organizers’ recognition of the difficulty of
managing large groups, partly to assure inclusion of interests, but also because of a concern
for balance. Although these consensus processes seldom relied on majority voting and often
required close-to-total agreement, both stakeholders and group organizers sought some rough
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parity typically in the numbers of voices representing particular views. Thus, for example, the
decision to include three business groups in the GMCP required that three environmental
groups also be included.
Our respondents confirmed that balance was important and that they believed stakeholders
should be represented in proportion to their roles. One local government representative who
felt his interests were underrepresented in the Growth Management Consensus Project, stated,
“I would have [arranged representation] so the cities and counties had much more weight.”
Representatives from conservation groups in San Diego were sensitive about being “tokens”
on some of the advisory committees, even though they largely believed their views were being
taken seriously by the business representatives. They felt they had to be better prepared than
others to compensate. If key stakeholders had what they regarded as insufficient voice in
relation to what they had at stake, they were likely to leave the process, especially if they had
alternative arenas in which to operate. For example, in the case of George Air Force Base, a
city that would be greatly affected by based closure contended it was underrepresented and
prepared its own competitive plan to present to the military.
Qualities of the Individual. Respondents invariably told us it made a great difference
which individual was selected to represent an interest. Some individuals were regarded as
“reasonable” by the others, while a small proportion were seen as intransigent or irrational.
Most organizers tried to assure selection of “reasonable” individuals as participants. As one
participant in the Contra Costa case explained, while they sought to be as inclusive as possible
in composing their citizens’ advisory group, “People who wouldn’t talk we didn’t call.” On
the other hand, respondents frequently discovered that people who had come across as
unreasonable and uncompromising at public hearings proved to be quite reasonable in the
context of the consensus-building process. Yet, uncompromising or difficult people did get
chosen at times, and they could block the work of the consensus process.
Looking across all the cases, we found no necessary relationship between intransigence
and the stakeholder’s interest. That is, even the stakeholder groups with interests that made
them resistant to reaching agreements might well be represented by reasonable individuals.
While the individual representatives could not change the fundamental interest of the
stakeholder, they sometimes did change the stakeholder’s position by reporting back on the
consensus process and convincing the stakeholder that a modification in its position might be
necessary. One of the business representatives to the Growth Management Consensus Process
from a group that strongly opposed growth management, for example, convinced key
association members that some type of land designation system would probably be developed,
and began to build support for a designation system the members would find less problematic
than the urban limit line that was under consideration. On other hand, a few individuals in the
GMCP were so difficult that even their associates found them “outrageous,” and regarded
them as poor spokespersons for their cause.
The need of consensus groups to accept individuals designated by their organization as
members to assure the backing of the organization, may mean that intransigent people prevent
the reaching of significant agreement among the rest. Some organizers aimed to get
“reasonable” participants, but as a result did not include points of view that would eventually
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require attention. Facilitators, where they were used, generally had skills to deal with difficult
players. But any demand for 100 percent consensus tended to give these players excessive
power and drive the motivated players to a separate arena.
The Problem of Representation
It mattered who the representatives were in relation to their organization. As one
experienced facilitator explained it,
When principals are at the table, their decisions matter. You really need someone
who can make a decision. The hard part is citizens’ groups where you join by sending
a dollar. Even if the representative is able to consult and return with commitment,
there can always be a new splinter group that protests. The main thing people need
is clarity about what a representative can commit to. They are often satisfied that staff
will recommend to but not speak for council members or agency heads a priori.
Different individuals have different capacities to speak for an interest and to commit that
group to action. Lobbyists are professional representers and often have formal meetings with
their client organizations, as they did in the Growth Management Consensus Process and the
Economic and Environmental Recovery Coalition, to propose and get approval for positions
they will take. They were sometimes able to bring the organization’s leadership to an
understanding of the issues and get the organization to shift its position to make achievement
of consensus easier. But even these professional representatives often could not fully explain
what they had learned to the members of the organization, and ran the risk of saying things in
meetings that their organization would not accept, despite having full information. These
lobbyists did not necessarily get agreement from their organizations for the positions they
would take, because the complexity of the issues and process made it difficult and tedious for
their organization members to learn enough to buy in to the conclusions. Lobbyists can get too
far ahead of their group’s views, as can any representative. In one meeting we observed,
lobbyists were visibly nervous about a position they took, which they did not know if their
organization would support. In another case, an individual who was a real leader in achieving
consensus began to lose credibility among some group members because they thought he could
not bring his organization along. Conversely, in another case, although group members knew
that no one at the table could commit to a decision, trust and confidence were high because
representatives had consistently done a good job of informing and bringing their constituency
along.
High-level public agency staff can often speak for their agency, but they too have
difficulty. One heavily involved participant in the San Francisco Estuary Project told us,
An agency is a consensus group. Internally the managers do not agree, but we try to
iron out these differences and present a common face. Agencies do have policies but
these are very general and could be given in one seven-word sentence. Different staff
interpret it differently. For example, Joe has a different view from Paul. One is “fish
sensitive” and the other is “politics sensitive.” Both tried to represent their
organization the way they saw it.
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Local officials and their representatives had an even more difficult time because of the
wide diversity of values and interests they represented — which, moreover, were typically
poorly defined and internally in conflict. They could work well in groups with other local
officials as they did in San Diego or Contra Costa, but when confronted with narrowly defined
interest groups they often took weak, lowest-common-denominator positions. This was the
case in the Growth Management Consensus Project, where local representatives insisted on
funding for planning but did not provide leadership on growth management strategy. One
representative to the GMCP noted that “LA 2000 found it hard to participate in this because
they were already a consensus group.” Furthermore, local elected officials could not commit
other members of their city council to any position they took. The problems of local
governments differed in degree, but not in kind, from those of most other stakeholders who
represented poorly articulated consensus groups. Local governments have substantial
experience with communication and discussion on regional bodies and the League of Cities,
but limited experience in these types of multi-interest groups.
Individuals who represented citizen groups with loosely associated memberships, such
as the League of Women Voters, or those made up of associated community groups and
individuals, like the Ethnic Coalition, were pretty much free to take a range of positions that
might be reasonable for their group, but had considerable difficulty if and when they tried to
get guidance from their organization. These citizen representatives were problematic from the
point of view of stakeholders representing more formally organized interests, as they were less
able than others to commit their membership to positions they advocated.
Some consensus groups were sensitive to problems concerning the relationship between
a group member and his or her constituency, and tried to address it directly. For example, the
ground rules for the Growth Management Consensus Project required the participants to
communicate regularly with their stakeholder group, and the Coachella Valley process was
based on the same understanding. At least one San Diego advisory committee made
membership conditional on the establishment of some regular form of communication between
members and their parent organizations. More typically, however, groups ignored the issue,
at times with problematic consequences. In Contra Costa, for example, a key environmental
representative in the consensus building process found himself at odds with his own group at
least in part because he had not kept them sufficiently apprised of emerging decisions. In the
end, several environmental organizations refused to actively support the ballot measure that
emerged from the process.
Commissioners in Bay Vision 2020 did not represent interests directly, as this was not a
stakeholder group. Commission members were selected as individuals, and were not officially
responsible for reporting to agencies or interest groups. LA 2000 was a hybrid, with some
members who might be viewed as stakeholders but most serving as individuals who could
speak for certain points of view. These two groups were designed in the more traditional blue
ribbon committee model, where the purpose is to provide leadership, visibility, and
respectability for a proposal, rather than as a stakeholder model, which is designed to bring the
key players into coordinated plans and actions.
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Coming to the Table and Staying There
After identifying stakeholders the next tasks were to get representatives to come to the
table, to create the conditions to keep them there, and to provide the incentives for them to
reach agreements. These problems existed for all cases. Even in the estuary projects, which
were set up under federal law, and had official federal and state sponsorship, no rule defined
which agencies or interests had to participate. Mandated processes such as the San Diego
Regional Growth Management Strategy, the San Francisco Estuary Project, and the Santa
Monica Bay Restoration Project, did have the advantage that many public agencies began with
the disposition to participate, and they and other players had reason to expect that what
happened in the consensus process might have an impact on real policy. This was not a
guarantee of participation, however. The Corps of Engineers chose not to participate in Santa
Monica, for instance, and joined the San Francisco project late, though it has a significant role
in coastal management. Other players who had formally agreed to participate did not
necessarily attend. For example, local governments were formally members of the San
Francisco Estuary Project, but few representatives actually attended meetings. In the Growth
Management Consensus Project, the governor’s  office refused to participate, despite requests
from organizers. As the reasons for declining participation tend to be politically sensitive, we
were unable to get meaningful explanations. There are risks, however, in a consensus process.
Key stakeholders often fear most participants will reach conclusions that they find
unacceptable, giving them only the choice of public opposition to what others have agreed.
The risks are particularly high for such players as the governor’s  office or the Corps of
Engineers, because their presence in the group may imply agreement to implement. Some
stakeholders believe they are better off reserving the right to decide after they see the results
(see Cost-Benefit Calculations, below).
How the Processes Were Initiated
For the nonmandated groups, there were two ways that participants first agreed to come
to the table. In one model, a third party with some power and decision-making ability, as well
as an interest in ending or avoiding conflict, initiated the group. Two of the base closure cases
were started by the local congressman, and state legislative staff initiated the GMCP, with
bipartisan legislative support. In these cases, players came in part because the sponsor had
some power to implement what they agreed, and obviously an interest in their reaching
consensus.
In the second approach, powerful parties with much at stake initiated the effort. They did
so usually after years of conflict or stalemate, after concluding they could not change an
unacceptable status quo unless they reached agreements with other key players. Thus
environmentalists joined with development interests to initiate the Natural Communities
Conservation Planning program (NCCP), Coachella Valley, and the Contra Costa efforts. In
the first two cases, the combination of the Endangered Species Act and significant
development opportunities in a fragile habitat area placed the players on a collision course
involving costly litigation, delays, and uncertainty about outcomes. In the NCCP, the process
failed to make progress until the state Resources Agency decided to take on leadership of the
effort. In Contra Costa, developers and environmentalists saw that by teaming up, both could
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achieve goals that neither alone had the political power or public support to achieve alone. In
most cases, additional players, beyond the highly motivated core group, often had to be
persuaded to join later. They did so in part because they saw the process gaining momentum
and potentially having results.
Benefits of Participation
The most important benefit of participation is the chance to shape a plan or policy. Thus,
stakeholders needed to know that something specific would emerge from the effort: new
legislation, a plan to guide agencies’ actions, or a reduction in the conflict and the costs of
litigation.
At times, direct financial benefits provided further incentives to participate. In Contra
Costa County local governments that were reluctant to engage in growth management were
induced to do so because some transportation tax money would be available for use on local
projects only to governments that participated in growth management. Although this was the
only case where direct monetary benefits were used as incentives for participation, local
governments clearly are motivated by financing opportunities (they participate, for example,
across the state in congestion management agencies because of the funding).
Costs of Participation
There were also costs to participation. Participation takes time and energy, and
organizations have to decide if they should use scarce staff resources for the effort. Just as
benefits go differentially to groups with most at stake, costs too fall differentially. Depending
on the resources of the group they may be prohibitive. Thus local governments, especially
smaller and poorer ones, found the costs of sending representatives too high in most of our
cases. Large jurisdictions like Contra Costa County or the City of San Francisco were among
the few that could afford to send participants to the San Francisco Estuary Project, or even to
monitor the program’s activities. In the Natural Communities Conservation Planning program,
Riverside County chose to leave the process due to insufficient resources. Well-funded
environmental organizations could participate and even send technically skilled professionals
to represent them, as could many business and development groups. Less well-funded
stakeholders sometimes sent citizens or elected officials, who could be effective participants.
Groups with paid staff, however, could participate more consistently and more knowledgeably
in some of the highly technical discussions that took place. In general, community-based
organizations were at a disadvantage (though they were involved in few cases). In one case,
the Economic and Environmental Recovery Coalition found funding to support travel to
Sacramento for such organizational representatives because they had a commitment to the
representation of these players. In other cases, such organizations were simply not at the table.
Another of the costs of participation that many stakeholders considered was that their
participation could help to legitimize a process that would result in a worse outcome than the
status quo. A stakeholder could join and become politically isolated, losing credibility. Ground
rules requiring that consensus be defined as 100 percent were established in a number of our
cases to reduce such a risk.
      Moore (1986).16
      For a discussion of the history of ballot box planning in San Diego see Calavita (1992).17
      Talbot’s 1988 study of environmental mediation also highlights the catalytic role of outside actors in18
bringing people to the mediation table. As he puts it, “The threat of losing money, or control, is a powerful
stimulus for negotiation” (p. 93).
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The Cost-Benefit Calculation for Participation
Participation in a consensus process depends on stakeholders making an implicit cost
benefit calculation. The first step is to assess their best alternative to negotiated agreement
(BATNA), as it is termed in the negotiation literature.  That is, stakeholders estimate whether16
they will do better trying to reach agreement in the group or by working through the channels
of power and influence they already have. For the environmentalists in the San Francisco
Estuary Project this was a conscious process, as they were constantly calculating their
alternatives. One of the key San Francisco Estuary Project staff noted that for environmental-
ists, “the compromise was simply to be at the table instead of in litigation.” One of the few
people we interviewed who spoke out against consensus building was one of these:
I think consensus processes are the pits because the environment often loses. In the
state wetlands consensus project, where the goal was to protect wetlands, the other
interests [farming and agriculture] weakened the goal. I would rather it not be a
consensus project. Majority rule  results in a stronger document for the resource. 
Our cases indicate that at least two major factors worked to convince potential players that
their best alternative to negotiated agreement was such that participation in a consensus-
building process was worthwhile: the likelihood that the prevailing state of affairs would be
preserved, and the availability of alternative arenas for decision making.
The Viability of the Status Quo. Potential benefits are measured in comparison to the
status quo. The status quo, even if not ideal, is at least known, and typically most stakeholders
have learned to live with it. In most of our cases, only a few stakeholders at the outset were
willing to risk changing from known problems to an uncertain future. When participants had
reason to believe that the status quo was in fact unstable, however, then participation in a
consensus-building process often became desirable as a way for them to affect the future. San
Diego County, for example, had been faced with a spate of antigrowth ballot initiatives before
beginning the Regional Growth Management Strategy. These made it clear that if stakeholders
did not do something about growth, significant numbers of citizens might take action at the
ballot box.  Thus, the default option became not the status quo, but potentially much more17
restrictive controls imposed through the initiative process, or at least an endless series of costly
battles fighting those initiatives. The Growth Management Consensus Project arose in an
environment of intense activity in Sacramento, after many bills had been introduced in the
state legislature over several years, and when both candidates for governor stated that growth
management was a priority. Though no bill had sufficient support to pass at the time, the
participants knew that the future might well involve state level action in this area.18
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Once a consensus-building group is underway, the group itself becomes a threat to the
status quo and thus a force that must be reckoned with. Even the opponent of consensus
building quoted above chose to participate in the San Francisco Estuary Project. She
explained, “If I had not been there, wetlands regulation would have been weakened.” The
mandated nature of the SFEP and the fact that it was sponsored and led by the EPA, the
principal federal regulator of water quality, created the worry among stakeholders that what
emerged might become law. Thus many players participated in the project defensively rather
than because they hoped for a solution of mutual gain. In response to the question, “What kept
you at the table?” a state water agency official answered,
Fear. [He laughed] Feeling that we had so much at stake that we had to be there. We
talked a lot about walking in some dramatic fashion, but we were afraid that [the]
EPA would take over some regulatory power over state water issues. It was hard to
say “we are not going to play.” The SFEP had substantial institutional structure, clout
and recognition. We participated in a damage control mode throughout.
A business stakeholder explained his group’s participation in a similar way: It was going on
with us or without us, we needed to be there. We couldn't have stopped it. We are forced to
play. Politically, it would look bad if we didn’t participate. The business and development
community are perceived as land rapers who don’t want to compromise and just want the
status quo.
The incentive to participate became even stronger in some cases after a critical mass of
committed and important players was achieved, along with some first-stage agreements. At
that point, reluctant players who thought they might be able to do better outside the process
often joined because the potential of implementable results had become high enough. This
clearly happened with the Economic and Environmental Recovery Coalition process. As the
first small group began to reach agreements and produce preliminary legislation, other players
sought to join. The choice for the latter became one of being in on the action or being left out
in the cold. 
Alternative Decision Arenas. The best alternative to negotiated agreement calculation
has to deal not only with how important the process is likely to be, as a practical matter, but
also with the alternatives the stakeholder has. When there were other arenas where players
could bring their concerns or challenge decisions, the consensus process was undermined.
Among those we studied, the San Francisco Estuary Project case was the most affected by the
existence of parallel arenas where the same players were debating over the same issues, as
happened in the water rights hearings at the state water board. The governor’s lack of
commitment to implementing a management plan for the estuary led players to believe they
would have a second chance to fight this out in Sacramento. They could seem to agree to the
plan in the San Francisco meetings, or at least not stand in the way of consensus, but still lobby
the governor and the legislature to remove the offending parts of the plan.
Similar dynamics occurred in the Growth Management Consensus Project, where a
number of stakeholders would not join the process until they knew the Republican was elected
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governor. They expected him to be sympathetic to their interests (unlike his opponent) and
believed that he would offer an alternative arena where they could challenge unacceptable
results from the GMCP. As in the San Francisco Estuary Project, the existence of other
decision arenas meant that group members did not have incentives to reach agreements that
required real change in their positions. In the base closure cases, the complexity of the
remissioning process and the decision making authority of the military allowed dissident
communities to believe they could do better negotiating on their own than they would in the
group. In the Los Angeles area, the biggest obstacle to regional coordination is the multiplicity
of overlapping and competing decision arenas and the fact that there is no structure  to identify
conflicting decisions or force resolution among them. 
On the other hand, when it could be established that the consensus group was the place
where the important action would be, this perception helped in getting and keeping
participation. Support for consensus building from the government institutions that would have
power to implement agreements was a strong factor in bringing people to the table and keeping
them there. It was a major reason for participation in the estuary projects, for example, despite
the alternative arenas and internal disagreements among state agencies. In the Natural
Communities Conservation Planning program, the leadership of the state resources agency and
participation of the federal environmental agencies lent credibility to the process of negotiating
the habitat plan. Even though some environmental groups did try to advance their agenda
through legislation and litigation, the NCCP process had enough political credibility to remain
the dominant arena, so they continued to participate.
Individual Motivations
Participation was also dependent on whether the individual representing the stakeholder
felt the benefits to him or her outweighed the costs. For the individual, the experience of
participating matters. If it is disagreeable or unrewarding, the individual often can choose not
to attend. Participants’ enthusiasm and interest or lack of it influenced, in turn, the commit-
ment of their stakeholder groups.
A major factor was that individuals often found participation in many of the consensus
groups to be personally rewarding — often despite conflicts that took place. They regarded the
groups as offering the opportunity for learning, as well as an avenue for making valuable
professional contacts. It was an opportunity also to be part of something important, working
with others. One participant in San Diego explained,  “Professionally I have to work for a
client. That limits my scope of work. Here I can speak freely. It’s a good outlet. I don’t have
to defend everything I say. It’s fun.” Another participant reported that she attended meetings
“because politicians and city managers were at the table. My work depends on who I know.”
An active participant in the San Francisco Estuary Project, whose agency sent him, said, “I am
an optimist. My involvement was because I think we can make something.” Our respondents
repeatedly cited the processes of building personal networks and relationships, and the
processes of joint learning and problem solving. These are central to keeping individuals at
the table and committed to finding mutually acceptable answers.
Over time, as personal relationships and trust began to develop among at least some of
the members, their incentives to stay increased. They had invested more and had more at stake.
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They began to share a desire to have something to show for their efforts. They came to care
about the group as well as the objective. As one SFEP player said, “I was willing to stay at the
table, to try to understand others, to change my view, to stand aside for something I do not
agree with. The group is more important than I am.”
There is a risk that participants’ enjoyment of the group and the desire to support the
group effort can cloud judgment and lead individuals, in the interests of achieving consensus,
to agree to things that their organizations will not support. Just that seems to have happened
in Contra Costa. One participant admitted:
A lot of us got in over our heads technically. . . . Our enthusiasm for the process got
away with us . . . It was so much fun reaching consensus, doing a big thing.
In that case, the organization this individual represented refused to support the agreement. In
some other cases, such as the San Francisco Estuary Project and the Economic and
Environmental Recovery Coalition, some observers speculated that certain heavily committed
participants, who led the effort, might not be able to bring their organizations along. This has
yet to be tested.
For individuals, the location of meetings was also important to assure participation.
Because the Growth Management Consensus Project was a statewide effort, the location of
meetings was a problem, and their location alternated from south to north. The large distances
in the 12-county San Francisco Estuary Project region also made participation difficult, but
they too used the strategy of holding meetings in different places. Clearly this is a challenge
for the Los Angeles region, where travel time and expenses are an even more significant factor
than they are in the Bay Area.
For many individuals it was important to feel that they were working for something they
believed in — something more than just getting benefits for their organization. Many told us
they participated because “I’m interested in it,” and also because “I care about the Bay,” “I
love San Diego” or, in the words of one of the most committed Economic and Environmental
Recovery Coalition participants, “It is a matter of pride as a native Californian. We always
used to be ahead but we are not any more. I really believe we need to do better.” Similarly, a
San Francisco Estuary Project participant who is involved in many regional activities
explained he is involved “Because I have the time and I feel it is my duty. I am retired and I
have a lot of knowledge. I am a lifetime Californian and I don’t like what is happening to the
state.” While these feelings are probably not enough to assure an individual’s participation
without other incentives, they played a significant part in the thinking of many who gave
tremendous time to these processes. They cared and wanted to make a difference. Many of the
processes ended up creating a sense of community and shared purpose among the participants,
which they strongly valued.
Stakeholder Participation Patterns
Some stakeholders left the processes, usually simply by not attending. We found no
obvious pattern to who left and under what circumstances. Those who are paid to represent
organizations with something obviously at stake were most likely to attend most diligently.
25
Citizens, especially those who were retired, housewives, or independently wealthy, were often
diligent participants. Some participants ceased attending because they came to regard the
process as not the best use of their time, or because they did not like the particular way the
process was managed. Elected officials were most likely to disappear from the process except
in Contra Costa and San Diego, where the main participants included local elected officials.
In the San Francisco Estuary Project only 25–35 tended to come to meetings out of the nearly
50 members of the management committee, and elected officials were not in much evidence.
Managing the Consensus-building Processes
A key feature of processes that result in agreements is that the participants, along with
staff, take charge and design them in ways that they believe will fit their own problems, tasks,
and players. Consensus-building processes were designed and managed in a variety of ways.
Staffing, use of facilitators, various structures of working groups, types of tasks and products,
and the procedures for discussion and decision were all combined in different ways in each of
the cases. Moreover, members redesigned and adapted the processes over time. Often, one
consensus group came to an end, only for another to emerge to continue the work. As both the
literature and our respondents testify, participants are more likely to buy into processes and
discussions over which they feel they have some control.
Staffing
Consensus-building processes require substantial staff assistance. In many of our cases
organizers underestimated the needs, or simply did not have the resources to provide adequate
staff support. One person, who ran a complex process almost single-handedly, identified four
important functions to be filled by staff. Her list was supported by our observations in other
cases. First, there are professional and administrative activities. Someone has to contact
players, find meeting places, set up meetings, make sure information is prepared, keep track
of what is going on inside and outside the process and generally figure out what the group
needs to know, and deal with crises of various kinds. A second function is facilitation. A
facilitator tracks issues, manages meetings, puts together agendas, talks to players in between
meetings about their issues and generally tries to make sure that a positive discussion is
possible, and assists in moving the group to reaching agreements. Third is a technical function.
Someone needs to provide specialized information, whether it is scientific information about
an ecological system, economic and fiscal analyses, legislative analyses, or the legal
framework for action. Finally, clerical assistance is needed to prepare records of agreements,
minutes and formal statements, keep information organized and accessible, answer phones,
and so on.
Staff were important in each of the processes we examined, but their relationship to the
process, the number of staff involved, and the source of funding for the staff varied
considerably among the cases. We identified three basic patterns to the relationship staff had
to the consensus-building process, with considerable variation within each pattern and overlap
among them. In the first pattern the process was basically staff led. In these cases staff
generated proposals, set meeting agendas, and did all the supporting analytic work. San Diego
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is probably the best example of this. In the second at least some staff served largely as informal
mediators among participants. In these cases staff worked hard between meetings, keeping
players engaged and satisfied with the process, often doing informal consensus building
outside meetings to prepare proposals that could be consensually adopted in the meetings.
Contra Costa, the Growth Management Consensus Project, the Natural Communities
Conservation Planning program, and the Santa Monica Bay Restoration Project all provide
variations on this pattern. In the fourth pattern staff served as assistants to participants who
themselves had technical expertise. San Francisco provides an example of this kind of
arrangement, where staff played a more reactive role, providing background information as
requested and relying on participants’ expertise. In all cases, however, staff were important in
creating and managing the process, working out what needed to be done, and suggesting ideas
to committees or the committee chairs, as well as in framing and presenting background
information that inevitably influenced the players who were not knowledgeable on a topic.
There was also considerable variation in the number of staff involved in each of these
processes, by and large independent of the role the staff played. Some cases, like Contra Costa,
were staffed by only a few individuals, and the Economic and Environmental Recovery
Coalition went for many months without staff at all. At the other extreme, the San Francisco
Estuary Project had up to 17 staff at different times, and the Santa Monica Bay Restoration
Project also had a substantial number. Yet in some cases, like the Growth Management
Consensus Project and Contra Costa, one or two staff members put in far more than normal
working hours, doing everything needed to make the process work.
Finally, there were significant differences in how staff positions were funded. Some
processes relied heavily on technical work by outside consultants, as did the San Francisco
Estuary Project. In other cases, the sponsoring agency provided staff, as SANDAG did for the
Regional Growth Management Strategy and the EPA did for the San Francisco Estuary
Project. The Growth Management Consensus Project and Economic and Environmental
Recovery Coalition staff director/facilitator raised the funding for her own salary, and the
legislature loaned several staffers part time to each of these efforts. In Contra Costa a
consultant played a major role as staff, but few players knew who paid him.
We could find no one staffing pattern or style of work that was obviously associated with
greater effectiveness in consensus building, nor even with greater participant satisfaction. In
general, most participants expressed support, respect, and appreciation for staff regardless of
what they did. Staffing and facilitation of the meetings made a significant difference to the
quality of participants’ experience. A participant in the Contra Costa effort credits part of its
success to the staff’s effort to make it enjoyable. The fact that SANDAG staff, who were
widely trusted among local governments and regarded as technically competent, provided
ample support for the Regional Growth Management Strategy process was clearly a factor in
the support local governments gave to that process.
Where staff work was irregular or where documentation and agendas were not provided
efficiently, however, participants became irritated, as they did in Natural Communities
Conservation Planning. This seemed to contribute to the atmosphere of tension and distrust
rather than alleviate it, even though the reasons for the problem almost certainly lay in the
agency’s lack of experience in managing such processes. A state official said the California
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Department of Fish and Game was not “institutionally prepared” for the task. Where staff were
employed by one of the interested parties, we found some mistrust. In the Growth Management
Consensus Project at one time, participants discussed sending the legislative staff away
because some feared they represented the Senate and Assembly leaders. Business and other
nonenvironmental interests did not trust EPA staff in the San Francisco Estuary Project
because they regarded them as pro-environment. A high-level EPA administrator agreed. “Our
staff are typically pro-environment advocates in the first place.” Only a handful of respondents
in all of our cases, however, complained of staff bias.
Although staff support was essential to all of the processes we looked at, we also found
that there is an important yet difficult balance between the need for staff to make the process
work and the need for hard work by group members in order for them to take ownership of the
process. If participants feel that they are simply acting as a sounding board for staff, as a few
in San Diego did, their commitment to the product may be weak. One San Diego task force
member, for example, believes that some of her fellow committee members did not take the
process seriously because “Staff did most of the work.”
Facilitation
In most of the cases we studied the facilitation function was handled primarily by the
committee chair and regular staff. In some cases, however, a neutral facilitator was employed
to assist participants in reaching agreements over particularly contentious issues.
The training and tasks of facilitators varied. Sometimes someone without professional
facilitation training played this role, perhaps employed by one of the parties. In other cases
(including the San Francisco Estuary Project and San Diego), committee chairs were trained
in facilitating meetings. Other processes, such as the Growth Management Consensus Project
and the Economic and Environmental Recovery Coalition, hired facilitators to run meetings.
In still other cases, a group would hire a facilitator to help with specific tasks. In the SFEP, for
example, a scientist/facilitator ran a workshop of scientists from different agencies and
disciplines to reach agreement on the controversial question of selecting an appropriate
indicator of water quality. Another facilitator assisted the land use subcommittee in resolving
its contentious issues. In the latter case the divided committee managed to reach a consensus
on the land use component of the management plan. And, at the end of the SFEP process, a
team of facilitators helped the management committee reach agreement on the wording of the
final plan. The Santa Monica Bay Restoration Project sponsored a facilitated process for the
Malibu Canyon watershed area because of the serious contention among land owners and other
players in that area.
Facilitators provided several forms of assistance. First, they assured that all the players’
views were heard. Second, they kept track of issues, statements, sticking points and
agreements in written form, so players could see them and feel they were making progress.
Third, they encouraged the reaching of agreements in a variety of ways, including reframing
the language, separating issues, and reducing the range of the disagreement to more-limited
points. When participants in the Growth Management Consensus Project were at loggerheads
on the desirability of an urban limit line, for example, the facilitator was able to partially
resolve the problem by getting agreement that there would be some sort of land designation
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system. At the San Francisco Estuary Project, a “computer facilitator” helped to further
discussion by typing proposed text for the plan and displaying it on a large computer screen
for all the participants to see. This meant that changes could be made to the plan on the spot
and participants could consent immediately to complex policy language.
With only a few exceptions, players greatly appreciated the work of professional
facilitators and believed that the person was essential to their work. One participant described
the group’s facilitator as “fantastic. She kept us moving along. She recorded our agreements,
so we had a sense of accomplishment and we did not have to go back over old ground.”  A San
Francisco Estuary Project participant said the outside facilitators were “Critical to the success
of the project.” Even one of the most disgruntled of SFEP players said, “the facilitators were
skilled and did a really credible job. Otherwise the meetings would have been totally out of
control.” In one case, a facilitator was sent away by a group who did not like his methods and
felt he was not knowledgeable enough of the people or issues. This group continued with
another facilitator whom they trusted more and who responded to their concerns.
Professional facilitators often had to perform a tricky balancing act between encouraging
agreement but not forcing it. The enthusiasm and “can do” attitude of the facilitator clearly
inspired and encouraged many players to keep working at agreement, in several cases.
Sometimes, however, they pushed very hard, and contributed to a sort of peer pressure for
agreement, as the facilitator did on the last day of the SFEP. The problem is that agreements
reached under pressure may not hold up over time.
Some players contended that facilitation should be done by a member of the committee:
I think it is better if a member of the committee does it. People should be trained in
these skills at conferences. People can be more useful if they can do this. But I think
you are better off if people in the know facilitate.
Others felt it was important at least to have a facilitator who knew the issues substantively, so
they could help with language and concepts and garner more respect.
Ground Rules
Ground rules about behavior, voting, and discussion methods played an important part in
the success of some of the processes we studied. In several cases groups developed ground
rules at the outset. In the Economic and Environmental Recovery Coalition, for example,
participation was contingent on agreeing to the “first principles” for managing growth. Early
meetings of the Santa Monica Bay Restoration Project focused on writing the group’s bylaws.
In the Growth Management Consensus Project participants agreed not to lobby on the issues
outside the group and agreed not to report to the press on the activities of others. As one
member explained,
We had to have a policy of check your guns at the door. You have to have initial trust
that this will be the main arena where things happen. You will get information in this
process about the players and their bottom lines. This process will not work if you
are going to use this information outside against other players.
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One of the most important rules was usually about how to establish consensus. Some
groups, like the Santa Monica Bay Restoration Project, sought 100 percent agreement and
attempted not to bring forward issues until staff felt they had unanimous support. In Bay
Vision 2020 consensus rules were never explicit, but the project director and chair only
regarded decisions as acceptable if they had an overwhelming majority of support, and they
seldom took votes. The Growth Management Consensus Project had to establish a 100 percent
rule to define consensus in order to get to the table players who feared that their vital interests
might be harmed without such a rule. This 100 percent consensus, not surprisingly, turned out
to be impossible to achieve, so they produced “emerging agreements” that were supported by
85 to 95 percent of players.
First Steps
Practices varied tremendously as to what groups did as first steps to get the discussion
going. Some tried to get agreement on what the issues were. Others defined mission statements
and goals. Still others tried to get agreement on the nature of the problem, at times
concentrating on the development of technical descriptions. A few operated as committees of
the whole to do most of the work, whereas others delegated responsibility to smaller groups,
organized in a variety of ways.
The Growth Management Consensus Project immediately began to identify the issues, in
part on the basis of four position papers prepared by the staff. Some disagreed with that
procedure, believing the group should have focused first on defining the problem. As one said,
“We should have sat down and decided what is the problem and what do we have to do to fix
it. We never did that.” Some other groups did start with a problem definition, such as in the
Natural Communities Conservation Planning program, where the problem was defined as how
to protect natural communities, rather than individual species, without preventing develop-
ment. Still, when the group began dealing with this problem definition, they found it was too
simplistic and had to continue working on it. In other cases, there was no agreement on a
problem definition until much later. In the San Francisco Estuary Project, for example, the
decision on how to measure water quality near the end of both estuary projects de facto defined
the problem. 
One approach that usually was noncontroversial and often produced considerable
narrowing of differences was to begin with an effort to define the situation in technical terms.
This could lead to agreement about value-laden issues like the nature of the problem, and
discussion of the basic values at stake. The experienced facilitator/director of one process
explained:
What we did was to start talking about the problem rather than the goals and feelings —
focusing on what are the growth rates and so on. If rational people look at the same
information they will have a lot of agreement. The information might be challenged, but
you argue with science, not each other. We made people vote on the information. This
means, in effect, developers have to agree that wetlands are a problem and in danger and
important. They do not have to agree on how important they are, but this is a first step.
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In this stage the ethical issues may come up, like whose problem is growth anyway. Is it
ethical for slow growth people to impose their views?
The value of joint fact-finding and agreeing on the data showed up in a number of other
cases, as discussed in the section below on intellectual capital. In the San Francisco case, the
issue committees’ first tasks were to supervise the preparation of status and trends reports on
pollution, dredging, wetlands, and so on. Although the expert participants said these reports
did not produce new information, they did help the groups to agree on the nature of the
problem and its seriousness. The process was both a learning exercise and a consensus
building one. Participants in some sense negotiated over what they would count as facts. The
Natural Communities Conservation Planning scientific review panel gave the science
legitimacy in the eyes of participants because they all accepted the panel as neutral. In the
Coachella Valley, experts reframed the issue in part as one of protecting the sand source for
the habitat — of protecting a dynamic system — rather than simply protecting a parcel of land.
In San Diego, the work of several committees began with developing technical
information. The information demonstrated to all group members that a problem existed. One
staff member described the process as it worked in the technical committee:
We show them a problem. “We have to fit 3.7 million people into the region in 2015.
Your general plans show that would be forcing a large number of dwellings into the
back country, into unincorporated area, because your general plans won’t  accommo-
date the growth.” They realize that having a large number of dwellings in unincorpo-
rated areas is unrealistic. It will be translated into demands for plan changes. Then
the question becomes how to plan for that now. We prove to them that there is a
problem. We can't just say SANDAG staff thinks there is a problem.
Other committees working on the regional growth management strategy in San Diego also
started work by using data to document that a problem really existed. The economic strategy
committee had to begin by developing a common understanding of the health of the economy,
which they did by developing comparative data. The data painted a picture of an economy in
decline, and forecasts projected a stagnant standard of living. A committee member explained,
For the most part, people in the end accepted the data. The data compared San Diego
to different cities. It examined the quality of life. You need something like this so that
you can monitor. The dependence of the region on the defense industry became
apparent.
Similarly, the first task of the committee working on regional infrastructure was to survey the
extent of infrastructure needs. At some level members all knew that there were needs, but that
knowledge was neither salient nor specific. The data the committee collected made it both.
One committee member argues, “It was good for the region to confront it. It was a great
exercise. We needed to acknowledge the shortfall in infrastructure capacity.” 
      This is described in Fisher and Ury (1981).19
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Conduct of Discussion
For the most part, participants reported that even where no professional facilitator was
used, those chairing meetings made a systematic attempt to hear the points of view of every
member. They tried to assure an environment in which individuals were all treated with equal
respect, although some individuals did come to dominate discussion. As the chair of one
committee in San Diego explained,
What we try to do is accommodate people’s interests. And the first thing you have
to do is get everybody to tell you what they are. We’ve got to be sure everybody is
heard. I protect anybody that's in a diverse position. I thank them for their input and
inquiry and validate their issue and concern . . . We don’t discount anybody.
A business stakeholder described the Growth Management Consensus Project by saying,
“The rules were not to make assumptions about what others think but to be open-minded and
listen.”
Creating this kind of positive environment could be very difficult, given the history of
contentiousness in many of our cases. As one group leader commented:
This is a very difficult group, hard-edged, used to fighting things out . . . I like them
personally, but I do think they are difficult to deal with. They don’t think twice about
stabbing someone in the back. This is not like a set of school teachers. These are high
level people and overimpressed with what their time means.
When the facilitation process worked well, at least during meetings, the force of the
argument became more important than the power of the agency an individual represented. As
one participant in the San Francisco Estuary Project commented,
I noticed that the power and prestige of individuals faded as people sat there over
time. The deputy director of the agency had no more clout than the Audubon society.
The organization behind the person faded after a while and it became just two people
— bricks banging into each other. The heat affected the whole room and eventually
brought compromise.
Some of the facilitators and chairs tried to use the concept of “principled negotiations,”
which says that the goal should be to move players away from fixed positions about desired
outcomes and instead get them to identify their underlying interests. Negotiation experts claim
that this approach is more likely to lead to resolution of issues as it is more flexible and may
lead to opportunities for mutual gain.  For example, from this perspective, developers should19
identify the ability to build and make a profit as their interest, instead of insisting on the
position of opposition to urban limit lines. Since this interest might be achievable in many
different ways, including within a land designation system of some type, pursuit of the interest
and not the position would allow more room for reaching consensus. Similarly, environmental-
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ists, instead of insisting on the position that urban limit lines must be created, could identify
their interest as creating greater certainty for the protection of habitat, natural resources, or
open space. One key leader of the San Francisco process told us, “Principled negotiations are
crucial. . . . [They offer] a broad framework.”
Working Groups and Committee Structures
All but one of our cases (Bay Vision) used multiple working committees that reported
back to a central committee. Much of the real consensus-building work was done in these
committees, whose design and structure varied from case to case, depending on the issues.
These committees might be made up of some members of the central committee, but most
often included additional people. The central committee was sometimes very large, but these
committees were typically closer in size to the number considered by experts on group process
to be most effective for discussion and reaching agreement. In most cases these groups did the
detailed discussion and analysis of issues and brought back recommendations. Consequently,
these committees involved the participants more deeply than the larger groups and engaged
them in a more personal way with other members.
These committees appear to have been essential to fulfill the complex agendas of the
consensus processes. They spread out the work, permitted participants to become really expert
on some aspects of the problem, and allowed in-depth consideration of issues. Inevitably,
however, they increased the need for coordination and communication, requiring greater levels
of staff support. 
We identified five types of committees that were combined in various ways in the cases.
First, all cases had a central decision-making committee — usually the largest group. Several
had technical committees. Two or three had committees that functioned as public advisory
groups. Several created issue-focused committees, and one relied on caucus and cross-caucus
groups. All types of the committees except the last were made up of stakeholders representing
diverse perspectives.
Technical advisory committees composed of technically trained agency and interest group
staff representing different perspectives were used in several cases. Their task was to define
and review technical information and to do so in a way that gave it legitimacy and credibility
for use in the process. Diversity of expertise and perspectives was important on these
committees because, as noted above, agreement on information can define the problem and
set the direction for the project. In San Diego, a technical committee composed of planners and
city managers from all SANDAG jurisdictions drafted the Regional Growth Management
Strategy. The Natural Communities Conservation Planning program and San Francisco
Estuary Project both also established special groups of scientists representing different
viewpoints to address particularly contentious issues. In the NCCP such a panel of scientists
defined what coastal sage habitat was, defined qualities of habitat, determined how much
habitat could be potentially lost, and specified guidelines for collecting data and designing
systems of preserves and corridors. In the SFEP a diverse group of scientists agreed on an
overall measure of water quality, the use of which would need to significant changes in state
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water policy. In both cases these committees produced widely accepted conclusions that
affected the direction of the main consensus group.
Public advisory committees were also set up in some of the processes we studied. These
committees functioned, as in the estuary projects, to oversee public information efforts. More
importantly, they were to make sure that key stakeholders in the community were identified
and involved. In Contra Costa, for example, the Transportation Partnership Advisory
Committee served this function as it became a forum for building consensus among all
interested parties in the county.
Issue-based committees were the most common and effective use of working groups. In
San Francisco, for example, the management committee identified six issues, such as
wetlands, pollution, and land use that required special attention, and set up committees for
each with membership including knowledgeable participants representing the important
different perspectives on the topic. These committees supervised the preparation of status and
trends reports on their issues and prepared the basic language for the final management plan
on their topic. They had heated and intense debates and in some cases required facilitators, but
when they did reach agreement, the larger committee was basically prepared to accept it. In
San Diego three such issue committees were created, on regional public facilities, open space,
and economic strategy.
The Growth Management Consensus Project chose a model for working groups that was
unique in our cases. They divided members into caucuses, each representing an interest (e.g.,
developers, environmentalists, local government, social equity), rather than set up diverse
issue-oriented groups. These caucuses were charged with developing positions on a set of
issues. After they had met for a period, they met in cross-caucus discussion to resolve the
differences between two caucuses. Thus the environmentalists would first decide on their own
concerns, then meet with developers to see if they could find common ground. They would
then report their conclusions to the larger central group. GMCP members had asked for this
structure because, although the group had quickly agreed on what the issues were, many
stakeholders who had not previously been involved in growth management debates felt
unprepared to discuss these issues. They preferred to do their learning with a group that they
believed was generally sympathetic.
This was not an uncontroversial approach. One supporter found the caucus a “brilliant”
strategy for resolving differences, and many participants generally found it useful. But a
contrasting view was expressed as well:
It was fatal to organize people in caucuses. The GMCP was flawed in design from
the start and doomed to failure. The organizing principle of caucuses which were set
up right away was designed to get special interests to come together and figure out
what their interest in growth management was. It gave them the time and opportunity
and encouragement to identify their own self interest (as opposed to identifying their
shared interests).
This caucusing method may have delayed or made more difficult the achievement of common
ground among the group as a whole. However, it may have been a necessary strategy in the
      Both psychology and business literature amply document the ideal nature of groups of five to 10 for20
productive discussion.
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context of this process, which had brought in players new to the issues. Another alternative
that creates less risk of divisiveness is for moderators to work individually with stakeholders
for weeks, even months, before beginning the process to help them determine their own
interests. This method was not used in any of our cases, but mediators we spoke with told us
they have done it in other cases.
A further complication of this caucus method was that issues were assigned to caucuses
so stakeholders got to discuss some issues in depth, but not others. This made for some
dissatisfaction because the larger group was not the most important forum for issue discussion.
One local government representative complained,
They threw cities and counties and regional governments into a group. We had
trouble agreeing on a governing structure and membership. We had a hard time
coming up with consensus. They did not put us into meaty issues. They gave these
to environmentalists and developers. I wanted to get into land use and urban growth
boundary issues and phased development, but we only discussed this in the large
group. But by the time the issues go to the large group a lot had been decided that
many of us were not privy to. Things had already been hashed out in other
committees.
Other working group structures also were used in our cases. Small ad hoc committees
representing different views had prepared agendas for the Growth Management Consensus
Project and wrote draft legislative language in the Economic and Environmental Recovery
Coalition. In Contra Costa, a small group made up of key stakeholders served as a preliminary
consensus-building body whose agreements were then brought to the full advisory committee.
Overall, the use of working groups was important for the consensus-building processes
we looked at. Small group discussion is widely recognized to be more effective  than large20
groups, and players in a number of cases said that the peer pressure for participants to come
well prepared was higher in small groups. Moreover, these groups often achieved a sense of
shared responsibility, which created the desire to reach agreement (although, of course, small
size offered no guarantee of agreement). On the other hand, decisions worked through in detail
in the small groups could not always be translated or fully accepted in the larger group. Still,
where small groups were known to be representative of divergent viewpoints, the larger group
tended to basically accept their work, though often with changes.
The Mix of Stakeholders in Groups
Working groups made up of stakeholders of similar type seemed to be more effective than
mixed ones. Members spoke with more respect of each other. They seemed better able to
establish a mutually satisfactory discourse. Thus San Diego, with committees made up almost
entirely of local elected officials or of agency staff, seemed to generate mutual understanding
despite the differences of interests among cities. The lobbyists representing organized interests,
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who were the principal members of the Economic and Environmental Recovery Coalition
understood one another despite the highly conflictual interests they represented. Generally,
technical advisory committees or scientific panels worked effectively together, even where
scientists came from different disciplines or agencies with conflicting perspectives. At least
they spoke a common language and applied common criteria to assessing information.
When the technical people in the San Francisco Estuary Project were mixed with citizens
and managers on the issue committees, technical participants were frustrated. As one noted,
“Some citizens had little at stake and little scientific understanding. The stuff is pretty damn
technical. Of the nearly 50 people on the management committee only four or five really
understand the technical issues.” These members were often impatient with citizens’
“anecdotal” evidence and with the manager members’ insistence on incorporating management
options into the status and trends reports instead of sticking to the scientific facts. Citizens and
interest group staff tried to incorporate conclusions about how badly off the bay was, but the
technicians resisted such normative judgments.
In the estuary projects the mixture of elected officials, citizens, and paid agency and
interest group staff produced a number of asymmetries. Those whose job responsibilities
included participation attended more regularly than citizens and elected officials. This situation
also led to an asymmetry of knowledge among stakeholders, as paid staff could and did take
the time to become better informed than most elected officials, who typically not only had
many other issues to deal with, but also had full-time jobs in addition to their elected positions.
Overall, local elected officials seemed not to mix well with other types of players, nor to
be able effectively to represent the concerns of local government in such mixed groups. Local
government representatives were not influential participants in the Growth Management
Consensus Project or the estuary projects, although they were ostensibly members. While this,
especially in the San Francisco Estuary Project, could be attributed to lack of attendance, staff
support, and knowledge, an important factor in both cases seemed to be the asymmetry of their
responsibilities in comparison to other stakeholders. As discussed earlier, a city official has
to represent a broad consensus across many views. A representative of local government
claimed, “GMCP brought in stakeholders tangential to the process — legal aid lawyers who
sue on housing issues. They have little interest and little to lose.” A lobbyist for the League
of Cities has to represent the lowest common denominator across many differing jurisdictions.
Moreover, local governments are at the center of growth management. They had much at stake
but could not take the narrow and effectively focused positions that could be taken by those
representing a singular interest.
In addition, there was a mismatch between the political rhetoric of some elected officials
(who were often sent as local representatives) and the professional language and demeanor of
paid staff. Other players were often impatient, even contemptuous of local players in the
Growth Management Consensus Project and San Francisco Estuary Project, calling them
“whiners” and “ideologues.” Local officials frequently represented the deeply held views that
land use control is and should always be a local function, while many of the other players
started with the belief that local land use control is the cause of the problem. This basic
difference in style and substance made it difficult to achieve the mutual understanding and
respect necessary for identifying and resolving differences. Representatives of local
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government did far better in working out their positions and needs in groups made up of other
elected officials or their staff.
Self-organization
Each of the processes we studied had its own dynamic and its own unique form. Most of
them evolved in structure and focus during their existence. The members in all of our cases,
with the assistance or guidance of staff, established the agenda, structure and procedures, as
well as the boundaries of the issues and selection of other members. In the Growth
Management Consensus Project the group quickly rejected one facilitator and decided the
members representing related interests needed to meet in caucuses. During the course of the
meetings they decided what their product would be like. In San Francisco, members decided
which issues should have committees assigned to them and invited new stakeholders into the
process once they began. In the Coachella Valley and Contra Costa cases there were no
external mandates, and the players ran the process completely. In San Diego the SANDAG
board added a ninth element to the Regional Growth Management Strategy, about the strength
of the economy, and a new committee to work on it, after business groups complained about
its absence in the original draft.
Participants often challenged arbitrary, or even carefully considered, decisions to keep
certain issues off the table. The groups demanded the chance to consider the issues that were
declared out of bounds after they had concluded that the issues were relevant. For example,
the San Francisco Estuary Project organizers’ decision not to address flows issues could not
be maintained, as the players concluded they could not solve water quality problems without
looking at the question. Similarly, the decision that the Mather base should remain an airfield
later had to be reopened. Although information on real constraints was important to the
participants — for example, on what the law would allow or on the political realities that the
project faced — even these constraints were sometimes challenged as a result of deliberations.
For instance, a participant in the Santa Monica Bay Restoration Project played a part in
preparing amendments to the Clean Water Act to remove some of the constraints that act had
imposed on the process, such as time deadlines.
A priori limitations on what could be discussed were inconsistent with the open ended,
problem-solving character of the processes we examined. The ability to control and shape their
own process, committee structure, and agenda were important to keeping players at the table.
This control gave the players a sense of empowerment and ownership of the process, thus
engaging them more deeply and committing them to seeking results. It gave them the
opportunity to use their own knowledge of local players, organizations, and controversies and
to design a process and set of tasks to fit these. 
Strategies for Reaching Agreement
The search for consensus meant that taking a vote at some arbitrary point was not a
legitimate way of reaching closure. Most, if not all, members needed to agree. Often, however,
groups could start making decisions by identifying those points on which agreement was easy.
Sometimes discussion led to new approaches that powerful players saw to be in their interest
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to adopt. At other times discussion led to such broad support for a position that it became
difficult for opponents to prevail. This happened in the San Francisco case, when the
agreement among participants that water quality was intimately linked to the issue of water
flows made it more difficult for state water agencies to contend that the two issues were
separable. Sometimes the discussion convinced those with minority views that the position
they were taking would never prevail. Under those conditions, representatives sometimes
persuaded their organizations to identify a more feasible position. In general, the desire to have
something to show for the months or years of hard work, along with the desire to be supportive
to the group with which they had developed working relationships and some common cause,
proved to be important incentives to reach agreement.
One pressure to compromise was the desire of key players to maintain the group’s
legitimacy and to obtain broad support for any proposals. When this was the case, concern for
legitimacy could lead powerful stakeholders to defer to politically weaker ones. For example,
social equity as a value showed up in all the Growth Management Consensus Project and
Economic and Environmental Recovery Coalition outputs in spite of the fact that social equity
groups were generally newcomers to the growth management issue. One social equity
stakeholder in the former told us, “Other stakeholders were very afraid we would walk. It was
important to them not to have this happen and for the legislators to know it. In general this
prospect was worse than giving in.”
Another pressure to agree was created in the San Francisco Estuary Project, where the
group decided that no member could write a minority report unless that member supported the
plan as a whole. This incentive was held out to the farming lobbyist when he indicated
reluctance to add his voice to consensus on the plan's adoption. If he did not agree, he would
not have the opportunity to put farmers’ concerns about wetlands policy into the report, and
five years of work would be of dubious value.
Where players had long been caught in unproductive conflict, introduction of new
stakeholders could changed the dynamic of the debate. An example was given by one member
of the GMCP: 
It was good getting the social equity people together with the environmentalists and
development interests and others usually involved in growth management debates.
Many of us are lobbyists and we know each other well and have already staked out
positions. This takes away from ability to build consensus. But to throw in new
people was a plus. You really had to think about what you are doing to them. So it
brought in a new issue that all of us could start thinking about and that framed new
consensus areas.
In the Economic and Environmental Recovery Coalition, where the discussion went
further into depth and specifics than it did in many of our other cases, participants often
discovered that an agreement that they had been able to reach in principle actually masked
significant problems. In the earlier Growth Management Consensus Project process, which
didn’t allow time for this detailed discussion, one stakeholder noted, “We did not get specific
enough to see exactly how it would work. The discussion was more at the philosophical level.”
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In contrast, the EERC, with at first about seven members and eventually as many as 15,
worked on legislative language over a period of more than a year of weekly lunch meetings
and day-long facilitated workshops. In the process of looking at concrete and specific
implications of alternative wording, members changed their positions. A small subcommittee
would bring in proposed language for a section, and the members would discuss it, bringing
in their own expertise. As they outlined the scenarios that might result, early agreement
sometimes disintegrated because members saw the proposal would have unintended
consequences. For example, participants who had originally supported bureaucratic
enforcement of local plan consistency requirements came to see that self-certification might
be a desirable alternative because of the legal difficulties of enforcing plan consistency.
In the San Francisco Estuary Project, the EPA hired a facilitator expressly to help the
management committee rewrite the draft management plan (which had been written by staff
and smaller committees). The emphasis inevitably was on “wordsmithing.” After someone
would disagree with a word, the group would search for another until one could be found that
did not immediately bother any of the players. Then they moved on to the next section. One
critic said this meant the focus was almost always on the language rather than the content of
the policy. “We got at the end, rather than substantive dialogue, debate and consensus on
wording,” noted a leader of the process. Another facilitator critiqued this approach on the
ground that it did not allow tradeoffs among issues, because it went over the report one
section, or even sentence, at a time. Although the management committee agreed to language
for the plan, a number of important participants contended consensus was thin. They had not
decided whether to support the plan until moments before the final vote, and then only because
some allies supported it. The fact that key players were highly uncomfortable with parts of the
plan seems problematic for its future implementation.
Duration of the Consensus-building Process
Consensus building takes time — not just months, but years. Many of the processes we
studied brought together stakeholders who had long seen their interests in conflict, who had
sharply different perceptions of problems, and who deeply mistrusted one another. Respectful
interaction over time was necessary to overcome these differences and begin to establish trust.
Getting to know each other personally was important. The group as a whole needed to review
its charge or, as in most cases we studied, invent its charge. They had to decide how to
proceed, to explore the viewpoints of each participant, and to try to understand the complex
situation they faced before they could even define the issues, much less reach consensus on
a policy or action. Meetings typically had to be several hours long, as players worked through
their concerns and understandings. Sometimes retreats and weekend-long meetings were
needed. Intervals between meetings were required for players to reflect and talk over issues,
for information to be gathered on issues raised, and for materials to be reviewed. In addition,
the players themselves almost all had other jobs and responsibilities, and could only spare so
many days or hours each month.
In all of our cases, just getting started took more time than many anticipated. As one
experienced participant recalled, “You get everyone to agree on an agenda. It may take a year.”
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A San Francisco participant said, “At the end of a year we had not even defined the playing
field. We drank a lot of coffee and tried to figure out the problem . . . Scientists on the
technical advisory committee spent two years deciding on the problem just among them-
selves.” The two cases where the initial process was limited to less than a year — Contra Costa
and the Growth Management Consensus Project — both had difficulties. Although Contra
Costa players did agree on action and joint support for an initiative, the eight-month process
did not allow some of the implications of the proposal to be fully explored, and some players
were later disillusioned by results. In the GMCP, in 10 months there was agreement on what
the issues were and, at least among many players, on general directions for action, but
members had not formulated specifics of legislation, and many serious sticking points were
not addressed. One participant explained,
We kept looking for consensus. We got shorter and shorter lists and areas of
emerging agreement. But 10 months was not long enough. It needed at least 18
months. Might be much longer.
In both cases, continuing group processes were needed before agreements on specifics could
be reached.
The time it took to build meaningful consensus depended on a variety of factors, including
the experience of the participants in working together, the degree of trust and shared purpose
they had developed, and the degree to which they already relied on common information. In
San Diego, for example, local officials and staff had worked together over a 20-year period
and already shared the view that they were all part of a region with common concerns. They
also could build on an existing information base created by SANDAG. In San Francisco, on
the other hand, many of the players had never sat together around a table, and the group
included very diverse stakeholders who had little understanding of one another’s perspectives.
Though most of the scientific information they ended up using was already in existence, it took
the group nearly four years to agree on which data to trust and on how to organize and present
it in their status and trends reports on the estuary.
Though it was essential to have enough time, too much time meant that discussion could
go on forever, with no closure. The self-organizing processes we examined dealt with the time
problem by establishing limited-term goals and targeting their products to meet the schedules
of other bodies. For example, in Contra Costa the filing deadlines for the November 1988
election provided a clear target date for results. As the deadline approached players became
more willing to make compromises. The Natural Communities Conservation Planning process
was guided by a sense of urgency to develop a habitat conservation plan as an alternative to
the pending petitions to have the gnatcatcher listed as endangered. The Growth Management
Consensus Project was pressed by the possibility that the legislature or the governor would
support growth management legislation at the start of the next session, and the players wanted
it to reflect their concerns. Economic and Environmental Recovery Coalition members, all of
whom sought legislation, feared the loss of what they saw as a window of opportunity. These
deadlines allowed progress, though they did not produce full consensus.
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The San Francisco Estuary Project, on the other hand, was given a five-year absolute
deadline by the federal government, without interim deadlines. This worked in two
counterproductive ways. First, at the outset, the deadline was so far in the future that it
provided little incentive for reaching closure in the early years. As the deadline approached,
however, it became necessary to hire facilitators who would push hard toward closure, cutting
off in-depth discussion of issues that simply arose again after the process was over.
Regional Differences
The metropolitan areas of the state differ in the degree to which players have a sense of
being part of a common region. In San Diego, virtually everyone we spoke with commented
on the widely shared sense of regional identity. The geography of the county contributes to this
sense since the county’s borders are well defined and its population is concentrated within a
few miles of the coast. The region is a single county and many of the municipalities are only
recently incorporated. For the most part, there are neither long histories of battles among cities
nor the long-term emotional commitments to a municipality that are more common in other
regions. Finally, whatever differences they do have, municipalities in San Diego County are
joined by pride in their differences from their neighbors to the north, in the Los Angeles area,
and by a shared conviction that they want to maintain this distinctiveness.
The story is different in the San Francisco Bay Area, where there is considerably less
consensus on a regional identity or on the concept of regional cooperation. The Bay Area is
a nine-county region with three major cities and, as the Contra Costa case shows, there are
deep cleavages even within a single county. In that county, the term “region” is used to
describe a section within the county, and when the consensus-building process started, there
was barely a “regional” sense within each of these. Nonetheless, the visual image of the San
Francisco Bay contributes to a shared sense of place, and many significant players do regard
themselves and their jurisdictions as belonging to a region. A strong environmental movement
that aims for urban limit lines and compact growth patterns contributes, on the one hand, to
a rhetoric of regionalism and on the other to the fears of some outlying areas that they will be
overwhelmed by the other players and unable to protect their own interests in a regional body.
Thus in the Bay Area there are both strong proponents of regionalism and strong resistance.
In the sprawling Los Angeles area, many key players do not regard themselves as
belonging to a common region. The sheer population size (15 million), diversity, and distances
make it uniquely difficult to link the region together visually, experientially, or administra-
tively. The area is made up of six vast counties, each of which has its own centers, though all
six have grown into a seamless pattern of development. Travel to a single meeting place is
problematic, and knowledge of other parts of the region is inevitably limited for any
individual. For these reasons, we expect that regional coordination through consensus building
will be most difficult to achieve in the Los Angeles area.
Not surprisingly, the metropolitan areas have very different histories of regional
cooperation and willingness to rely on their councils of government. San Diego is character-
ized by a two-decade-long history of intergovernmental cooperation within the county and a
highly successful council of governments, which has engaged in a wide variety of planning and
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regional administrative activities since the 1970s. Through participation in SANDAG local
officials have gotten to know one another and have learned to work together. Although, even
in San Diego most players oppose creating a regional government, many acknowledge that
SANDAG has de facto become a sort of regional government, and they are quite comfortable
with SANDAG in that role. This comfort made it possible for the blue ribbon committee set
up by Measure C to designate SANDAG as the agency in charge of formulating the regional
growth management strategy, thereby avoiding creating yet another layer of government.
In contrast, in the Bay Area, Bay Vision 2020 met substantial opposition from local
governments to its proposal to merge three regional agencies, including ABAG (Association
of Bay Area Governments), the regional COG, because of their fear of consolidated regional
power. Players in the Los Angeles area are debating whether to maintain a single COG at all
— SCAG (Southern California Association of Governments) —  or to split it into multiple
COGs. One well-informed City of Los Angeles player reported, “No one trusts SCAG as
representing the city. However we will let them try subregional planning.” A number of the
other people we spoke with in the region also spoke of not trusting SCAG, ironically because
they said it was dominated by the City of Los Angeles. Yet SCAG is the only multipurpose
regional agency that covers the area.
Nor are local governments trustful enough of county government in the Bay Area or Los
Angeles area for counties to provide the locale for a more regional scale of planning. Contra
Costa officials felt compelled to create a new countywide organization to administer its
Measure C because of local mistrust of county government. Many attribute at least part of this
mistrust to recent statewide budget cuts that have resulted in what one county stakeholder
termed a “war” and “cannibalism” between cities and counties, as each seeks ways to finance
their activities at the other's expense. Thus, state-level decisions on how to make cuts have
exacerbated conflicts between cities and counties.
Each of the three major metropolitan areas also has a different distribution of powers and
responsibilities among its regional agencies. SANDAG has both Metropolitan Planning
Organization (MPO) and Congestion Management Agency responsibilities among its many
roles. In the Bay Area ABAG is not the MPO, but rather the Metropolitan Transportation
Agency, and counties have their own congestion management agencies. In Los Angeles,
although SCAG is the MPO for the region, the powerful Metropolitan Transportation Agency
is expected to receive $180 billion for the next 30 years to do transportation planning and
projects. A growing planning effort in Orange County challenges SCAG’s role as well.
In the Natural Communities Conservation Planning program the state was sensitive to the
desire of local governments to determine their own planning areas. Consequently, local
governments were allowed to establish their own multijurisdictional planning areas called
“subregions,” as long as the state and federal resource agencies agreed that the boundaries
chosen were ecologically defensible.
Formal Products of the Consensus Processes
The formal products of consensus-building processes were of several kinds, such as
consensually agreed-upon plans, guidelines, legislation, performance standards, technical
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descriptions of a situation, and sometimes simply lists of agreements. In San Diego the
primary product was a Regional Growth Management Strategy; in the estuary projects it was
a Conservation and Management Plan, along with a scientific characterization of the estuary
or bay, as well as recommended indicators for measuring water quality. In the Growth
Management Consensus Project it was a list of largely agreed-upon principles, and in the
Economic and Environmental Recovery Coalition it was draft legislation. The Natural
Communities Conservation Planning program has thus far produced a set of biological survey
guidelines for conservation planning, process guidelines for creating subregional plans and
conservation strategies, and conservation biology standards to be used in these plans. The
Coachella process involved creating and implementing the details of a habitat conservation
strategy and designating and acquiring specific areas for protection. One of the base closure
processes produced an agreed-upon strategy. In Bay Vision 2020, the product was a report
proposing some basic features of a recommended regional governance system. In Contra Costa
the product was a set of ballot measures that passed.
The first product of these consensus processes was often largely descriptive rather than
prescriptive. It was apt to be quite general, focusing attention on certain issues and pointing
to desirable policy directions, rather than specifying precise actions or allocating costs and
benefits. It was not, in most cases, a document reflecting the resolution of major conflict. In
San Diego, the Regional Growth Management Strategy was basically a compilation of existing
federal and state mandates. In the San Francisco Estuary Project the first product was a set of
status and trends reports characterizing the estuary. The plan itself was largely about tasks that
were going to be done in any case, at least in the view of many participants. In the Growth
Management Consensus Project the first product was a list of “emerging agreements” which
really consisted of a set of principles on which players agreed — such as, there should be some
type of land designation system, or there should be certainty for all players. These agreements
said nothing about how to implement them nor how to set priorities among them, but they did
represent a narrowing and focusing of the issues.
Even these largely descriptive products and general principles played an important role
in improving coordination, however, and set up the conditions for continuing cooperation. In
San Diego, the very act of compiling mandates in such previously separate areas as
transportation, air quality, water quality, and solid waste served to focus players’ attention on
the interrelationships among these issue areas and to get all localities within the county
thinking in similar ways. In the SFEP, the description of the estuary in terms of its salinity
levels marked a movement away from the traditional ways that many agencies or interests
looked at the problem of water quality. It was no longer mainly a question of measuring
pollution “at the end of the pipe.” Moreover, by implication, the actors (dischargers, regulatory
agencies, environmentalists, and developers, among others) were acknowledging that the
problems of the estuary were collective rather than discrete problems caused by individual
polluters.
In some cases, significant agreements were achieved in the consensus process that
changed the conditions for future action. The near-consensus on the use of the salinity measure
in the San Francisco Estuary Project meant that the federal government could use it as its
official water quality measure, and thus challenge California’s politically powerful water
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interests. The focus on water quality indicators related to human health in the Santa Monica
Bay Restoration Project represented a new direction for water quality management in the bay.
In the Natural Communities Conservation Planning program the development of a
sophisticated concept of protecting whole natural communities within interconnected
landscapes was an important new contribution toward resolving the conflict over endangered
species. It was creative because it gave opportunities to developers, greater certainty to
environmental advocates, and guidelines to local land use planning. Most important, it created
better coordinated and more proactive conservation planning by local, state, and federal
agencies, instead of waiting to react once a single species is on the brink of extinction. In
Contra Costa, the agreement to link transportation improvements to some form of growth
management marked a significant breakthrough.
In the Growth Management Consensus Project and later Economic and Environmental
Recovery Coalition, the agreement to include social equity issues in the growth management
strategy represented substantial learning among participants and redirection of their proposals.
As one of the leaders of the equity stakeholders in GMCP noted,
The parties wanted to pigeonhole social equity as an issue at first. They wanted to
label certain questions as appropriately considered only when social equity was on
the table or to associate it with issues like civil rights, or other specifics. Social equity
is not a particular thing, or an interest. It is a value which has to be considered
throughout the discussion. It took about a year for them to get this straight.
These first-step products were also valuable for their role in paving the way for other,
more difficult to achieve, agreements. The ability to demonstrate success created trust and
commitment to the process. The products themselves marked the creation of intellectual
capital and provided a record of this shared knowledge. With these products some groups were
ready to move on to more complex tasks. For example, SANDAG committees have been
working on recommendations for new financing mechanisms for regional infrastructure, on
issues of open space acquisition, and on a regional economic strategy, all of which will
eventually be incorporated in the RGMS. Addressing these “home grown” issues marks a
major step beyond just responding to the federal and state mandates included in the original
strategy.
A crucial and, in most cases, unanswered question is whether such formal products as
plans or guidelines will be implemented, and whether legislation will pass. Indeed, some
players and observers assume that the test of consensus building lies in implementation of
policies and plans. As one of the key players in the Santa Monica Bay Restoration Project
explained, “Success will depend on the ways to implement the plan. It depends on agencies
accepting responsibility and on funding. It is not clear it will happen.” Only one of the cases
we studied (Coachella Valley) is far enough along to permit an assessment of how effectively
agreements will be turned into actions, and in this case the results are mixed. Responsible
agencies, however, do not necessarily have to be coerced to act if they have actually bought
into a plan. One agency head told us, “I want to use the plan as a basis for implementing
actions, but not as a club.” In San Diego a number of local officials said they anticipated the
      Presumably, dissenters from this approach did not participate in the first place, although many of those we21
interviewed were skeptics at the outset, and even the ones who did not get much of what they wanted from the
process still felt it was the way to do things.
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Regional Growth Management Strategy would be implemented in great part through peer
pressure as neighboring communities looked over each other’s shoulders. In some cases, the
mere fact that consensus has been achieved on a plan may leave others without the politically
viable choice of ignoring it. One skeptic in the San Francisco Estuary Project said, “If that sort
of thing [consensus processes] gets the governor to sign the plan, then it may have been good.”
Participants’ Assessment of Consensus Building
Those we interviewed were almost all supportive of consensus building as a method. A
typical comment was, “This way of getting people together to work things out is the wave of
the future.” Though players differed in their enthusiasm for the particular process they were
involved in, we found no dissent from the idea that, in principle, consensus building was the
way to deal with the issue they faced.21
The more sophisticated observers also understood that consensus building was useful for
coordination. As the chair of the San Francisco Estuary Project said, “I can say we have gotten
better coordination through consensus process, though we did not necessarily have consensus
on everything.” One facilitator explained how it works: “Somewhere along the line people
realize you cannot have it all. People may grumble, but at this point it often seems just
common sense. Consensus building does not solve everything, but it does solve a lot.” A San
Francisco participant used a systems metaphor to capture the subtle changes that resulted from
consensus building:
Things are so rapidly changing that we can't say what is. We cannot see some things
past our belief system. It looks like disorder, but I can now see a different kind of
order, order in process and change, instead of certainty and hardness. The difference
after consensus building is that before, things were stable in a bad situation, while
now they are flowing in the right direction. Now the no action solution is no longer
acceptable.
Participants also sounded notes of caution and criticism, reminding us of the inherent
limitations of consensus building. As one pointed out,
It can be done at the wrong point. It has to be when everyone knows there is a
problem. It also depends on who is at the table and if the issue is small enough. It can
work quite well but things have to be at the boiling point. 
Another, commenting on the San Francisco Estuary plan, noted,
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There is a danger that we have created something so unrealistic that it will fail. The
process moved forward by the lowest common denominator. It’s good enough, let’s
go forward. A great piece of sausage was developed.
One critic of the GMCP thought:
The consensus process is useful for finding where land mines are, but on something
as broad as this, just short of a constitutional convention, it is not right to bring
special interests together to do the job.
Summary of Findings
  • Consensus building did not happen spontaneously. All the cases had either a legislative
mandate or committed leadership to start them off, along with incentives for key players
to seek agreement.
  • Groups were self-organizing, whether the consensus process was mandated by law or was
an ad hoc effort. The groups chose stakeholders; structured subcommittees; set ground
rules; framed the problem; and decided on tasks, procedures, and products.
  • Most groups tried to include all interested stakeholders to assure that the agreements
could be implemented.
  • Stakeholders came to the table and tried to reach agreement when the status quo had
become unsatisfactory and they became convinced they could not accomplish their goals
in other arenas, or when they became convinced they would have to participate to protect
their interests. 
  • Participation and willingness to compromise were affected by members’ perceptions of
the likelihood that agreements would be implemented.
  • When parallel arenas were available for resolving the issues, the potential for agreement
diminished.
  • Staff played crucial roles in each case, facilitating and managing the whole process, and
providing technical information.
  • Consensus building takes substantial time — at least one year and as many as five in some
of our cases — to reach agreement on a complex plan.
  • Consensus-building processes generally involved multiple committees, that formed and
reformed in response to issues that emerged.
  • Although the processes were highly conflictual at times, participants stayed involved, for
the most part. They expressed support for the consensus approach to the issues and
claimed to have learned a great deal.
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  • Local government representatives had a difficult time participating effectively, except
where they were the principal players, as in San Diego. The reasons include limited staff
capacity, the diversity of the local interests they represented, and the differences between
elected officials and other players at the table.
  • There are tremendous differences across the state’s three largest metropolitan regions in
attitudes toward regionalism and in the experience of agencies and jurisdictions in
cooperating at the regional level.
  • In almost every case, agreements were reached on legislation, plans, policies, performance
and monitoring standards, or principles and guidelines for public agency action.
  • It remains too early to judge the outcomes of the processes in terms of actions carried out
as a direct result of formal agreements and plans, except in the Coachella Valley, where
a number of actions have resulted.
  • New consensus groups have been created in some cases to work out the implementation
approaches. These continuing efforts are among the products of consensus building.
      Coleman (1990).22
      Gruber, Coordinating Growth Management through Consensus-Building: Incentives and the Generation23
of Social, Intellectual, and Political Capital, University of California, Berkeley, Institute of Urban and Regional
Development, Working Paper 617 (1994).
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DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
In our view, a focus on formal products and their direct consequences is a short-sighted
way to assess consensus-building processes. If we evaluate these cases solely by such things
as plans agreed on and implemented or legislation passed, most of them would be counted as
failures or, at most, limited successes. Though most have produced plans or policy statements,
sometimes these do not represent major changes, and often conflicts remain. In addition,
implementation prospects may be unclear, as the plans lack teeth or funding.
All the processes we examined, however, contributed to coordination and altered the
actions and attitudes of both participants and the organizations they represent. These results
can be seen as contributing to long-term changes in the ways of doing the public’s business
— changes that move in the direction of greater communication and collaboration among
players and greater agreement on the facts and actions. These changes have contributed to a
reduction in the paralyzing conflict that has characterized the growth arena in recent years.
They have helped to institutionalize norms of interaction among players that are less
adversarial and litigious and more collaborative and aimed toward gradual mutual accommo-
dation.
The Creation of Social,
Intellectual, and Political Capital
We contend that consensus building achieves its coordination effects in great part by
creating or amplifying three types of capital: social, intellectual, and political. In successful
group processes, an essential element is the creation of capital beyond that which individual
participants initially bring with them. We use the term capital because it represents shared
value that can grow as it is used. Once created, this capital lives on among participants even
after the group disbands, and it facilitates future coordination. Social capital, in the form of
trust, norms of behavior, and networks of communication, creates the potential for serious
discussion to take place among otherwise conflicting stakeholders.  Intellectual capital, in the22
form of shared and agreed-upon facts and understandings, provides a common basis for
discussion and moves the players toward agreement on policy issues. Political capital, in the
form of alliances and agreements on proposals that provide mutual gain, creates the possibility
that proposals will be adopted and implemented in the political arena.23
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The processes through which social, intellectual, and political capital are created reinforce
one another. As participants learn to communicate and trust one another — i.e., as they amass
social capital —  they are more likely to be able to agree on a common indicator of a problem.
As participants come to understand one another’s policy needs, they are more likely to
overcome previous mutual distrust, even if they still don’t agree. And, as social and
intellectual capital are amassed, a group is in a better position to deal with the outside world
and create the political capital necessary to turn agreements into action. Where one or another
type of capital was missing, or where the group did not give attention to creating this capital,
there were real limitations on its effectiveness. The production of capital became a benefit
produced by the group and the ability to share in it an incentive to keep people at the table.
Social Capital: Coordination Through Personal
Relationships and the Building of Community
The most striking finding of this study, because we observed it in every case, was that
virtually all participants valued the consensus-building process in principle, and most found
it provided both personal benefits and relationships that furthered their organization’s goals.
For example, a representative of one of the least-satisfied stakeholders in the Growth
Management Consensus Project told us, “I thought the process was very positive. I met a lot
of people and now I know where they are coming from.” In the Coachella Valley case, a
county planner noted that, “Career-wise, it was the best thing I have done.” Another from the
process, who was unhappy with the results, nonetheless said of his own participation, “It was
absolutely worthwhile. It is always good to get people talking. You get to size people up and
it is always good to know people individually.” But the overall result was also to further the
organization’s objectives. As another San Francisco Estuary Project member said, “Good will
is an important ingredient in all this. The estuary project is a good example of how good will
was developed over time.”
The first step in consensus building was for participants to build social capital. They
learned how to talk and listen to others with whom they had adversarial relationships and little
or no communication in the past. They met over meals and in other informal contexts. In the
process, they learned that their adversaries were real people, rather than cardboard stereotypes.
They learned that their basic interests were not necessarily fundamentally at odds, despite
opposing positions they had staked out beforehand. They learned that there were substantial
areas and issues on which they could agree. For many participants these were revelations.
Many players came to develop some trust of former adversaries, even teaming up with
them — as did environmental and development interests in the Natural Communities
Conservation Planning program, the Coachella Valley, and the Economic and Environmental
Recovery Coalition. Even though trust was not invariably created, lines of communication and
a degree of understanding were routinely established. Where there were already working
relationships, consensus building strengthened and expanded them to more players.
Participants were increasingly able to discuss issues constructively inside the meetings as well
as outside. One developer in the NCCP, who disagreed strongly with one of the environmen-
talists, concluded that over time this environmental advocate had come to genuinely want to
      Chisholm (1989) describes the importance of personal networks as a way of coordinating in the case of the24
BART (Bay Area Rapid Transit) system and regional transportation planning.
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find solutions. One player in Growth Management Consensus Project explained how they built
trust: “We yelled at each other for hours and then went out to lunch. This brought issues to a
human level.”
These individual relationships turned into personal networks that participants used outside
of the meetings for many coordination tasks.  As one federal agency participant in SFEP24
stated,
One major result of the process is I now have networks into 40 different groups
representing different values and points of view. If they have frustrations they can
call me. I get called a lot. I call them a lot too. I am on the phone with the Sierra Club
almost every day. I try to find out what they are doing and to see what I can do to
help that is consistent with (our agency’s) objectives.
Commenting on the effect of the process on others, he added, “The networks cross
organizations and disciplines, scientists, managers and politicians.”
The net effect of these relationships over time was to build community. Social capital is
the principal ingredient of a shared sense of community. Moreover, social capital allows the
participants to respond flexibly and appropriately to complex issues and mandates. The
comment of one experienced consensus builder, who was part of the Growth Management
Consensus Project, expresses this view:
The process of doing it [consensus building] was important. Process is ephemeral,
getting together and breaking apart, but it parallels the flexible linkages of industry
they talk about today which strengthen industrial organization, and make it adaptable
to change and innovative. This kind of process may be a beginning of having
democratic institutions work in similar ways. You build a kind of glue. You build
communities of trust and interest.
Intellectual Capital: Coordination 
Through Shared Knowledge
In all cases, the consensus-building group built a shared base of knowledge, though the
type and amount of such knowledge differed widely across cases. At a minimum, the group
learned about the perspectives, problems, and understandings of members and the interests
they represented. In the Growth Management Consensus Project, for example, environmen-
talists and developers learned that most growth policies had equity implications for ethnic
minorities and the poor. Environmentalists and developers each learned that certainty was
important to the other. In Coachella Valley they learned that both groups disliked the
piecemeal project-by-project approach to conservation planning and both preferred long-term
comprehensive planning to protect the species, though for different reasons. Participants in all
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cases learned about the problem, found out where they had common ground, and identified the
“deal breaker” issues for the others.
This shared understanding included knowledge of how each participant’s actions affected
the others. In some cases participants went a step further and came to recognize they were all
part of an interdependent system, and they learned something about how that system worked.
In the San Francisco Estuary Project, players learned how water quality was a result of a
complex combination of effects of discharges, runoff, dredging, water flows, and construction
on wetlands, and that there was no simple relationship between a single activity and
environmental outcomes. In the Contra Costa case, participants learned about the needs of
different regions of the county and how the different parts of the county were linked by travel
patterns. Before the process started, the very concept of a transportation corridor was foreign
to most participants. In Coachella Valley, developers and local government representatives
learned about the complex processes of the dune ecosystem, while environmentalists learned
about land acquisition and development. They collectively learned how these two processes
had to be joined to protect the habitat.
A major part of the shared understanding was, in most cases, an agreed-upon set of issues
or a shared view of the nature of the problem. The Growth Management Consensus Project
quickly developed a list of the issues that needed resolving. In Contra Costa County new
understandings of problems were created in early brainstorming sessions, which led to a shared
view that transportation and growth management issues had to be linked for either to be
addressed effectively. Discussions also led to a new understanding of the structure of
transportation finance, as key players convinced others that a county tax source was necessary
to produce matching funds needed to obtain state and federal transportation money.
Participants in San Diego used technical information to convince themselves that a
problem existed and had to be addressed. Staff used population projections to demonstrate
persuasively to planning directors and city managers that population growth through the early
part of the next century could not be accommodated within existing general plans, and that
therefore a new plan had to be created. The economic strategy committee had to develop a
common understanding of the nature of the economy in statistical terms before it could begin
its work. Similarly, the first task of the regional infrastructure committee was to survey the
extent of the county’s infrastructure needs. Though members all knew there were needs, that
knowledge was neither salient nor specific. The data the committee collected made it both.
Some groups built scientific descriptions of problems or designed measures for
monitoring and control. Sometimes these tasks were accomplished through consensus building
among scientists alone; sometimes they included nonscientists. Participants questioned and
challenged scientific findings, defined concepts, and agreed on statements of fact and ways to
define technical problems. In some important sense they constructed the facts through a social
process. When they did so successfully and achieved agreement, the intellectual capital that
resulted was an important coordinating tool.
In several cases one of the group’s tasks was to build an agreed-on data base. This is
similar to the process referred to as joint fact finding in consensus-building literature.
Typically it involved assessing, interpreting, and selecting among existing data those that were
most reliable and relevant to the issues. The estuary projects provide the best example because
      See Ozawa (1991).25
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they were required to develop a scientific characterization of the estuary. A major achievement
in both was that players moved away from adversarial science, which had been encouraged by
the use of litigation as a conflict resolution strategy, to consensual science.  In adversarial25
science, no one believes anyone else’s data and, as one of the leaders among the technical
players explained,
there is no question of peer review. Moreover, differing opinions are equally
weighted. So, if 99 percent of the scientific opinion supports one view and only a few
people support another, they are weighed equally.
In contrast, in the San Francisco Estuary Project the validation of data was done in a group that
included many experts searching for consensual criteria for accepting research findings as
accurate. In this process the participants also selected the facts they determined were relevant.
Agreement on these facts marked an important step in coordination.
This effort to develop information sometimes translated into agreement on plans or
policies. In the Natural Communities Conservation Planning case, the work of the consensual-
ly accepted scientific review panel formed the basis for several key aspects of the program.
This was particularly remarkable, as species protection is an area in which there is normally
acrimonious debate and mistrust among technical staff working for different players. The work
of the panel convinced the other participants that 5 percent of the coastal sage scrub habitat
in the planning area could be developed before the long-term plans were in place without
compromising the viability of the natural community. In the Coachella Valley case, studies of
sand transportation convinced developers that the final reserve had to protect not only the sand
dunes where the endangered species lived, but also the dunes’ sand source, which was some
distance away. The studies also indicated that the dunes could be perpetuated even if all sand
sources were not protected. As a result, the environmentalists changed their position and
agreed that some sand sources could be left out of the reserve.
In other cases, agreement on data helped to frame problems and point groups in particular
policy directions. In San Diego, the data the economic strategy committee put together showed
not only economic decline, but an economy based heavily on tourism. This definition of a key
part of the problem became a focal point for discussion of solutions. Once the committee came
to accept this idea as fact, it structured members’ thinking about the economy and brought
them to a common starting place for working through solutions. SANDAG’s data on
population growth framed the growth problem, because they showed that most growth was
occurring from natural increase and not primarily from immigration, as many had assumed.
For the regional infrastructure committee in San Diego, technical information helped to
create criteria for evaluating alternative policy directions. The issue was how to fund new
regional infrastructure. A split developed on the committee between those who wanted to fund
regional infrastructure exclusively from impact fees levied on new development, and those
who wanted to include other revenue sources. In the end, the debate was resolved after
participants looked at the data showing that current infrastructure deficits were not solely due
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to new development. Only then could they agree that impact fees could not be the sole source
of funding.
In Contra Costa County, an important piece of intellectual capital was an agreed-upon
description of the political landscape. One key set of stakeholders, a group of developers,
commissioned a series of opinion polls exploring, among other things, support for a variety
of specific transportation improvements. The polls became a key reference point for the group
as a whole when considering the impact of including various proposals in the ballot measure
they were preparing. Since everyone accepted the polls as valid, they served as a reality check
against which participants could evaluate proposals and resolve controversies.
Technical information did at times resolve disputes, but only when both technical and
nontechnical players agreed to the accuracy and appropriateness of the data. This agreement
was not easy to achieve. In the SFEP, the co-chairs of the technical advisory committee put
substantial effort into bridge building between these two sets of players. One of them said:
Most technical people are not willing to work with policy makers and try to
understand what they want. Managers don’t ask the right question and technicians
don’t study the right thing. The communication problem is both ways. We put
together a workshop of technical and managers. We accomplished getting them to
talk and trust each other. Managers kept saying, “tell us how bad the bay is.” They
want to know how much it costs to clean it up and who would do it, but the
technicians are concerned with the scientific descriptions.
Technicians reluctantly agreed to managers’ insistence that the data in the status and trends
reports should be published only in combination with management options.
In both estuary cases, indicators designed as a result of the group’s discussions became
consensual criteria for assessing water quality. These indicators may turn out to be the most
significant products of the process in terms of policy impact. In the Santa Monica Bay
Restoration Project, agreement on monitoring certain bacteria counts represented an agreement
that dangers to humans in their use of the bay were a central priority. In the San Francisco
Estuary Project, the scientists’ workshops and ensuing discussions in the management
committee led to near-consensus on the 2 parts per thousand isohaline measure (a measure of
water salinity associated with the generation of biodiversity) for assessing the health of the
estuary. This agreement reflected a priority for promoting biodiversity in the estuary and a
change from an earlier policy focusing on end-of-the-pipe pollutants and the prevalence of
individual endangered species. As a system outcome measure rather than a measure of an
individual factor, the choice of a salinity measure reflected an emerging understanding that all
the players’ activities are part of a common system, the health of which is important to all.
Most significantly, the use of this measure has already challenged the strongly held position
of the powerful state water agency, because this kind of measure intrinsically associates water
quality with water flows, which that agency had tried to keep off the table. Although the
appropriate location of this salinity level within the estuary for optimal biodiversity was a
more controversial question, at the present writing federal agencies are proposing to use the
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location defined by the group as the standard for assessing Bay-Delta water quality in their
regulatory processes.
Political Capital: Amassing the Power to Act
These processes to varying degrees also produced political capital — that is, they created
alliances among players, giving them individually and collectively more political power than
in the past. Where agreements were meaningful and players had truly adopted the ideas and
policies in a consensual way, seeing them as providing joint gain, these agreements carried
political power behind them. The comment of one participant could be echoed for the other
cases: “The consensus aspects generated a lot of support for the San Francisco Estuary
Project.”
Participants in the Contra Costa County case were acutely aware of their need to build
political capital, since their whole effort was a response to the failure of an earlier ballot
measure. Leaders of the first ballot campaign quickly turned to a political consultant who
urged including the major opponents of the first measure in the consensus-building process.
This decision meant that the final measure contained projects in all parts of the county,
return-to-source funds that would benefit cities, and parkland bonds to satisfy the environmen-
talists. The agreement among these players not only provided the political capital to pass the
measure, it also established new alliances that were to continue in the next phase. Political
capital was also an important product of the Growth Management Consensus Project and its
successor, the Economic and Environmental Recovery Coalition, as each resulted in political
alliances among business and environmental interests, along with a variety of others. Though
the political capital developed was not necessarily enough to implement a project or
legislation, it was often enough to change the political landscape for the future. In the Natural
Communities Conservation Planning and Coachella Valley cases, the participants were well
aware of how powerful their alliance was. In the latter, participants remarked on how
impressed congressional staff were when environmentalists, developers, and local officials
came to Washington to lobby jointly for their plan. Furthermore, because the state Resources
Agency had made NCCP a high-profile effort, most participants in that project believed that
the state had committed itself to producing a final product.
Missing political capital appears to have been a limiting factor on the achievements of
several cases. In the GMCP/EERC the failure to get agreement and support from a substantial
proportion of local governments, from substantial segments of the business community, and
from the governor has been a principal obstacle to passage of legislation. The political capital
amassed by the EERC may be enough if a governor more predisposed to support growth
management is elected. In Bay Vision, intellectual capital was created as the group spent much
of its time learning about the issues, but little political capital, because the membership did not
include the stakeholders and activists who would carry the legislation. In general, the creation
of shared political capital is associated with having the significant stakeholders at the table.
Certain stakeholders may be necessary to generate adequate political capital for
implementation. In the San Francisco Estuary Project, for example, one participant contended
that because the process did not include stakeholders outside the estuary, the results lacked
statewide support:
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The management committee is not balanced. It has a regional bias towards the Bay
and Delta. It does not consider overall statewide water issues, which is important,
because once water diversion is on the table, it becomes a statewide issue. The state
water contractors’ association, the state water project users, are major diverters from
the estuary, and they were not allowed to participate. This meant a lost opportunity
to bring in support for the process from the farmers, water users.
While this political support would have been valuable, the estuary project was unlikely
to have attained it if the other stakeholders had been involved, because a parallel consensus
process that included these water users (the Tripartite process) was unable to resolve the
issues. The inclusion of these stakeholders might have hampered the building of political
capital among the other players. It remains to be seen whether the estuary process has altered
the distribution of political capital sufficiently to change the outcomes for the San Francisco
Bay.
The Consequences of Consensus Building: A Summary
Consensus-building processes coordinated players’ actions, reduced conflict, and provided
the opportunity for effectively managing growth. Consensus building helped in a wide range
of ways to get the many actors in the growth process functioning as part of a common system.
Much of this coordination can be described as the building of shared social, intellectual, and
political capital among the stakeholders. We anticipate that this capital will remain and that
it will grow as it is used in the future. Thus we believe the results of these processes will
continue to be felt in the long term, because they have already influenced practices and
institutionalized norms of interaction.
To summarize, consensus-building processes had the following results:
  • Plans, strategies, legislative proposals, and ballot measures were produced that were
supported by many, if not most, important stakeholders. Each of these in itself is a
coordination tool.
  • Consensus was reached on information describing the issues, on indicators for monitoring
and assessment, or on scientific principles for environmental management. Stakeholders
began to operate with the same information and criteria.
  • Stakeholders, formerly in conflict, developed lines of communication and some degree
of mutual understanding, trust, and capacity to work together constructively. They learned
how their actions affected one other. They developed less stereotyped and less adversarial
views of one another.
  • New personal networks were created among stakeholders, which help their organizations
coordinate their actions. These have become flexible linkages across agencies, levels of
government, and the public and private sector, which allow for rapid and appropriate
response to issues.
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  • Stakeholders affected by the issues, but not previously involved in public discussions,
were brought into consensus-building processes and learned how the proposals would
affect them. Coordination was thus extended to more players, and actions were based on
a broader set of perspectives.
  • Stakeholders gained new and largely shared understandings of the problems, their causes,
and consequences.
  • Stakeholders’ organizations changed their actions, positions, and policies, moving closer
to others’ views, as a result of what their representatives learned during consensus
building.
  • Some processes resulted in a shared understanding of how all members play a part in a
common economic, transportation, or ecological system.
  • Participation has changed the practices of the members, many of whom have begun to use
consensus building in their other work. The result is to reduce conflict and help to build
a culture of collaboration among these agencies and interests.
These effects each occurred in some, but not all, cases. Many conditions in the
institutional context were important to the success of an effort, as was the design and
management of the process itself.
The Institutional Context for Consensus Building
The frameworks within which consensus building took place had several features in
common. In each case a set of basic conditions brought stakeholders together to seek
agreement. The combination of conditions was important, as each worked in conjunction with
the others. The first was that key players saw the status quo, or the most likely future, as
unacceptable. In some cases a threatened change in the status quo was what triggered the
group’s formation. Secondly, no one stakeholder or agency, or even small group of
stakeholders, had the sole power to control the outcomes. Many stakeholders had some power,
if only to stop action. Third, the stakeholders had some reason to believe that if they did reach
agreement, their conclusions were likely to have a significant impact on public action — that
decision-makers would pay attention. And fourth, for individual stakeholders to be willing to
come to the table they had to believe they would have sufficient influence at the table to make
their participation worthwhile, and that this was the best arena in which to accomplish their
purposes.
The consensus-building efforts we examined were self-organized, adaptive, and operated
with considerable independence and autonomy. Committees formed and worked for a time and
sometimes ended their work, only to be followed up by other committees, picking up where
they left off. Ad hoc and long-term committees were created as participants perceived the need
for them. Individuals and interests were grouped and regrouped. New stakeholders were added
as the group identified missing interests or knowledge in the course of its work. Consensus
groups largely determined the structure and details of their own tasks, even in cases like the
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estuary projects, that required broadly defined products like characterization of the estuary and
conservation and management plans. Groups made their own decisions about whether to
develop strategies, plans, policies, legislation, technical data, performance standards, or other
products.
The institutional context provided incentives for collective action and a framework that
enabled flexibility and self-management. Although something in the political, legislative, or
economic environment created the incentives for consensus building and offered potential
rewards for success in reaching agreements, no authority dictated precisely what should be
done or how. This freedom and autonomy were often cited as a key to engaging the
stakeholders over time and giving them the sense of ownership over the process that was
essential to their willingness to try to reach agreement. Nonetheless, this freedom was bounded
to some degree by participants’ own knowledge of what was practical to do and by messages,
formal or informal, from decision-makers and responsible public agencies about what kinds
of tasks and agreements could make a difference.
CHALLENGES AND NEXT STEPS
Consensus building is a crucial strategy for successfully managing growth, and should be
given a central place in state planning. Although it is time consuming, we believe that it will
save resources overall by reducing conflict and encouraging many types of invisible forms of
coordination and mutual adjustment in the shared power context in which growth occurs.
A Framework for Consensus Building
As we have demonstrated, consensus building does not happen spontaneously. All of the
cases we examined had special features making the issues ripe for consensus building. They
all had either a legislative mandate or committed leadership to start them off. The environment
in which they operated provided the conditions to encourage and enable them. Their success
also depended on the design and management of the processes themselves. To make consensus
building an integral part of growth management the state will have to create the institutional
context and incentive structure to enable the building of social, intellectual, and political
capital among the important participants in regional growth.
The state can create the framework necessary for successful consensus building. First, it
can alter the status quo, which now involves local governments and state agencies making
growth-related decisions independently of one another. By requiring that state agencies
coordinate growth-related decisions with regions it can change the rules of the game for this
decision-making. It can require the creation of a regional plan or strategy, if not by local and
regional players, then by the state. Such threats to the status quo change the incentive structure
facing potential participants by presenting risks to those who do not participate.
Second, the state can legislate to reduce the power of any agency with an overwhelmingly
strong mandate that provides little incentive for cooperation. Air quality districts or heavily
funded agencies such as the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transportation Authority are candidates
for such action. At the same time, by providing staff or technical support to such players as
community-based organizations or poorly funded local governments the state can increase the
participation of other stakeholders whose voice is needed to get fair or effective growth
management, or who might otherwise stay outside the process and sabotage it.
Third, the state can assure the participants in growth management that agreements they
reach will carry weight, or that their agreements will be implemented and plans carried out.
Finally, the state can reduce the alternative arenas simultaneously available to resolve
growth-related issues by creating forums and arenas specifically designed for these debates to
occur and requiring local governments, state agencies, and others to resolve issues and
differences in these arenas before initiating lawsuits or independent decisions.
Perhaps the most challenging aspect of creating these new institutional arrangements for
managing growth will be to create a new set of norms and expectations, not only in
Sacramento but across the state. These new practices would not involve top-down regulation
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or bureaucratic control. Instead, many different forms of action and strategy would develop
in different parts of the state, though framed by some common constraints. The idea of creating
a framework for flexibility means that policymakers have to tolerate considerable variation in
the implementation process. On the basis of this research, however, we believe that the
benefits of relying on self-managed, adaptive processes are significant and may indeed be
essential to the effectiveness of growth management.
Implementation of Plans and Policies
Implementation is likely to be at least as contentious as policymaking, and thus consensus
building is likely to be necessary after plans and policies are adopted. The evidence in our
cases is that formal mechanisms to enforce agreed-upon plans, policies, and other documents
might well be insufficient to assure implementation. As several of our cases have shown,
agreements in principle break down when specific and potentially binding language must be
accepted. In some cases, difficult issues were deliberately postponed in the interests of
achieving agreement on initial phases of a plan. In Contra Costa, for example, discussion of
the order in which projects would be done over the 20-year life of the measure was not
included in the original proposal to the voters, and this has proved to be a highly conflictual
issue. In the San Francisco Estuary Project, even setting up the plan implementation committee
was a highly contentious process. As implementation depends in considerable part on the
depth and quality of agreements, consensus building should be regarded as a continuing
exercise needed over time.
The Local Government Role
Local governments must be willing and active players in both designing and implementing
growth management systems. Their knowledge of how regulation and public investment play
out in local communities, and their unique control over land use, make it essential that they
come to the table and stay until agreements are reached. The agreements must be real and
lasting because it is local governments that must implement much of growth management. A
local government representative to the Growth Management Consensus Project provided this
perspective:
Any successful growth management strategy has local government as a key player.
They can make a program not work if they have not bought in. They are the ones who
know how to do it. They are the only group that can make a bridge among the players
and activities.
The experience of other states supports this view. In Florida, for example, where a
top-down approach to growth management incorporated heavy financial penalties to localities
with plans that were inconsistent with state policy, 50 percent of all plans submitted in the first
round were judged inconsistent. Despite the state’s strong enforcement powers, years of
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discussion and negotiation were required to get local plans into forms acceptable to the state.
Moreover, state guidelines were challenged in lengthy administrative 
hearings and ultimately had to be changed because they were not adapted to the variety of local
conditions. In Maine, where a state bureaucracy was also charged with reviewing local plans
for compliance with state requirements, agency staff admitted they could do little more than
mechanically check for inclusion of appropriate elements, statements, and information. They
had no way to check local plans for their substantive coherence with state policies and
purposes.
In California, the difficulty of trying to impose a solution on local government is
aggravated by the fiscal crisis. Even if the legislature could pass a growth management
program without the widespread support of local governments, the long series of cutbacks in
local funding and revenue sources has made the sanction of cutting funding for local
noncompliance an idle threat in the view of many local players. The revenue potential from
sprawling shopping malls and single-use office developments is often more compelling than
the financial penalties or incentives for cooperation that the state may offer. Moreover, the
sheer size of the state and its own financial crisis demand that any growth management
requirements must be to some degree self-enforcing rather than enforced by an army of
Sacramento bureaucrats. The willing cooperation of local governments thus seems essential.
Unfortunately, our cases demonstrate that it is difficult to get local governments to be
effective players in diverse stakeholder groups for many reasons. They lack staff support; they
have difficulty developing clear positions because of their broad responsibilities; and the
rhetoric  of local officials sometimes does not mesh well with that of other participants. Except
in the cases where local governments were principal players — Contra Costa, Coachella
Valley, and San Diego — local representatives were the most often absent from meetings and
most dissatisfied with results. Even in Contra Costa, local governments became major players
only after failure of the first Measure C, in whose development they had played just a minor
role. With these exceptions, we found few examples in which local government players
asserted leadership in the processes. Instead, many expressed frustration and a sense of
powerlessness.
It is possible that local governments have a fundamentally different interest than members
of either the development or environmental community and reaching consensus may be
difficult. An urban lobbyist in the Growth Management Consensus Project stated the basic
problem:
Cities want a lot of flexibility at the local level. This conflicts with the developers,
who want certainty. I would love a self-certification process for local plans, but
developers don’t want it. This is one of the key elements in the debates. We all had
goals coming in except localities. Environmentalists want, no matter what, to save
open space. Developers want certainty. Cities feel so battered. They are whining, but
everything comes down to the city in the end. They have to balance everything.
Everyone wants something from the cities.
One problem that particularly concerns local officials is the conflicting mandates they
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have from state and federal agencies. As a League of Cities representative noted,
We keep saying that the state needs to make its own goals consistent, and put the
state agencies together to resolve issues instead of expecting us to resolve the
inconsistencies at the local level. We are victims of this failure. The state needs to get
its act together.
Local governments have particular difficulty in assigning appropriate representatives for
the time-consuming work of consensus building. In many of our cases cities were represented
by elected officials, who have many responsibilities and many other competing regional
meetings to attend. They also usually have at least part-time, if not full-time, other
employment, and cannot take the time to be as well informed as those who are paid to
participate. In addition, they are typically not expert in the matters before the group, as are
many of the other stakeholder representatives. Many local elected officials use the emotional
rhetoric of local control and private property rights, and thus speak a very different language
from that of the other participants. One local staff member with substantial experience
working with elected officials suggested this solution:
Elected officials should be brought in only last to sponsor proposals. Politicians are
not long-term players. They want to know what they can do now. Do not include
them until you have specifics that you want them to do.
Relying on staff as local government representatives also presents problems. Budget
cutbacks of recent years mean that small-to-medium-size cities send staff to meetings only
where they expect payoffs to their participation. The potential benefits of participation in many
of these processes, however, are not clear to local governments. As a group they have not yet
identified some objective they could seek from growth management and do not have enough
staff to participate, like some agencies, in “damage control mode.” Often, local governments
have found passive resistance to be their best defense against unwanted regulation. The
calculation many make is that they will deal with the new mandates when and if they get them.
The result in many of the consensus-building processes was that much of the time no one
represented local governments.
We did find local governments to be effective and diligent participants in San Diego,
where local governments led the growth management effort and knew they had much at stake.
But it was also an effort in which the consensus groups were a less diverse combination of
stakeholders. Local elected officials could be comfortable speaking with other local officials,
and technical staff with each other in separate groups. It was also a case in which local
governments knew the process would be important and assigned their staff to attend technical
committee and other meetings. This case demonstrates that there is nothing inherent in local
governments that prevents them from being effective participants in consensus building, but
their needs and problems must be carefully addressed.
      The 18-month, 35-member Growth Management Consensus Process required $171,000 in cash26
contributions, $25,000 in fees for retreats, and an estimated $192,000 of in-kind contributions of staff time  from
public and private groups, for a grand total of nearly $400,000 for a project designed to reform statewide policy.
(From Final Revenue Statement, California State University Sacramento, Growth Management Consensus
Project, July 1, 1990–December 31, 1991). The Economic and Environmental Recovery Coalition, which was
only seven to 15 members during 14 months, and which relied less on professional facilitation, required $82,000
in cash and in-kind contributions (from Budget California Economic and Environmental Policy Mediation,
CSUS). Neither of these figures takes into account the hundreds of hours of time donated by group members, nor
their travel costs.
By comparison, an impact assessment of New Jersey’s consensually adopted state plan estimated that with
the plan municipalities and school districts alone would save $400 million annually, $65 million of which would
be saved in capital infrastructure costs statewide, and air and water pollution would be significantly lower (New
Jersey Office of State Planning, and Rutgers University Center for Urban Policy Research, Impact Assessment
of the New Jersey Interim State Development and Redevelopment Plan, February 1992).
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Cost Effectiveness of Consensus Building
Although this study did not attempt to enumerate the costs of staffing and organizing these
processesin any systematic way, the costs are low in comparison with the alternatives.  Even 26
if all the donated hours and supplies and phone calls were accounted for, the combined cost
to public agencies and private players of reaching agreements through consensus processes is
far less than the costs of litigation, delayed projects, and restoring unprotected environments.
In many cases, staff for consensus-building processes simply do tasks they would have been
doing less effectively in other contexts. Even where technical information was generated or
consultants were hired, the cost effectiveness of the work was higher than it is in many other
policy analysis processes because the participants themselves requested and used the
information. Little of the information produced was not seriously considered in relation to the




State legislation should be designed to make consensus building an integral part of the
development of growth management policies, plans, and implementation strategies.
Consensus building plays an important role in coordinating growth management and
potentially reduces costly conflicts. In so doing it permits the development and implementation
of coherent policy in this complex arena.
The state should establish and coordinate its own policies and programs related to
growth and the environment.
A principal obstacle to coordination at all levels is the conflicting messages and mandates
that come from different state agencies. Experience elsewhere demonstrates that at least a few
goals and broad principles at the state level are necessary to provide a framework for more
specific plans by state agencies and regions and to establish criteria for resolving conflicts in
agency missions.
California should establish a state-level council, made up of agency directors, to set goals
and priorities and coordinate state policies. This body should work with regional coordinating
groups to develop consensually agreed-upon state strategy.
This study shows that state agencies can achieve agreements among themselves and with
other participants in consensus-building processes. In states where growth management
programs have not included a responsible state council or commission, the legislature regularly
has to prepare annual legislation to fill in gaps or correct initial programs, and regional players
lack guidance. Such a council, along with regional goals, priorities, and policies, can provide
the flexible and adaptive institutional framework that is needed to manage growth through
consensus building. The social, intellectual, and political capital that are essential for
institutionalizing long-term collaborative relationships depend on a consistent framework of
expectations and processes that can be provided by a state council.
Regional coordination and planning must be central to any growth management program.
Growth management must have a regional focus. It is at the regional level where
growth-related activities exert their effects. Metropolitan economies are regional in character,
as are the activities of residents. Within regions are players with both the knowledge and the
motivation to plan and implement growth management in consensually agreed-upon ways.
The state should create strong incentives for regions to organize and for localities to join
regional coordinating bodies and reach agreements. A primary incentive would be the
requirement that state agencies follow regionally developed strategies that are consistent with
state goals, priorities, and performance standards.
Local governments should be offered at least two powerful incentives to cooperate with
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each other in the region. The state should make infrastructure funding contingent upon
cooperation. It should also offer regions where there is cooperation the chance to influence
state investment and regulatory decisions. Changes are also needed, however, in the fiscal
incentives and revenue-raising opportunities of local governments, which now discourage
intergovernmental cooperation and encourage these governments to permit environmentally
damaging forms of development. Incentives are likely to be more acceptable politically than
sanctions for failures to cooperate. A regional strategy should be adopted consensually, with
agreement of most jurisdictions within the region. Since the strategy will cover many issues
and involve the distribution of both benefits and costs among localities, reaching agreement
is feasible because many tradeoffs can be made. A region that does not adopt a growth
management strategy of its own after two to five years could be subject to the state council’s
preparation of a strategy for the region.
Regions should organize themselves, and establish consensually their own boundaries,
institutional and interagency relationships, and committee structures and powers.
As each region has a unique history and experience, and a unique distribution of
responsibilities among its public agencies, participants must “own” their processes and design
them to suit their own conditions and problems. Some regions already have the basis for
cooperation in place. Some can involve a single county or COG. Others may require a system
of subregions. No one-size-fits-all regional structure is appropriate for all regions in the state.
Moreover, the structure of the regional coordinating group and its subgroups probably should
evolve over time to adapt to emerging issues and problems.
The state council should negotiate with each region to establish tasks and timelines, so
that the differences among regions, the magnitude of their tasks, and the work they have
already done can be taken into account.
These tasks should be simply defined, leaving the details to be worked out at the regional
level. Deadlines should depend on the scale and controversy of the tasks. It may be appropriate
to establish statewide performance standards with interim targets suitable to different regions.
The state council should negotiate performance standards, guidelines, or implementation
strategies in a consensus-building way with regional bodies that have adopted regional
coordination strategies and plans.
These specifics of implementation may be more contentious than the setting of broad
policy. Negotiation and consensus building in establishing standards and guidelines will
anticipate or avoid many conflicts and assure that they take into account the diversity and
unique characteristics of the different parts of this vast state. This negotiation will help assure
support and implementation of state policy and objectives. The right to sit at the table with
state agency heads can become a substantial incentive for the regions to organize themselves
and for localities to cooperate in a regional context.
The state council and regional coordinating body should be designated as the primary
arenas for discussion. Where differences cannot be resolved within the region, mediation and
conflict resolution services should be made available. Procedures should be established for
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appealing decisions of the regional consensus group at the state level, possibly to the state
council or a designated hearing board.
Our cases show that where there are multiple arenas for decision-making or substantial
ambiguity about how and where decisions will be made, consensus building is undermined.
Stakeholders leave the table or have little incentive to make difficult choices. Insofar as is
legally possible, state agencies should refrain from making decisions on issues while they are
under consideration in regional arenas and should indicate to participants that their decisions
will be respected if they are congruent with agencies’ missions. In some cases the missions of
state agencies may need to be changed to require them to consider growth management
concerns in their decision-making. Mediation services, offered either through the state or
drawing on the growing body of mediation professionals in the private and nonprofit sectors,
can reduce the need for expensive and formal legal proceedings and appeals.
The state should provide funding to staff the regional consensus-building efforts.
Consensus-building processes will require technical, clerical, and administrative support,
as well as support for professional facilitators to assist with particularly difficult tasks. The
cost of staffing these processes is minor compared to the costs of conflict and failures to
coordinate, which the state currently confronts. As these staff must be regarded as unbiased,
the funding should not be controlled by an agency with growth management interests or one
that is viewed as politically partisan.
The state should cooperate with regions in building a shared information base to support
consensus building.
Consensually agreed-upon technical information can play a significant role in coordina-
tion and can become shared intellectual capital for all participants. This can occur not only
within regional consensus processes, but also between regions and the state.
The state should provide financial support to local governments so they can take
leadership roles in the regional consensus processes.
The willing and effective involvement of local governments in regional consensus
building is crucial to the success of growth management, but the costs of participation are now
high for them and the benefits uncertain. To participate at all, much less to take leadership
roles, local governments need to believe they can adequately represent their interests, and
therefore need to dedicate staff time to participation, as well as preparing technical analyses
and proposals. Because of the budget crisis and their need to deal with such fundamental
issues as public safety, local governments have little staff to devote to such activities.
The state should provide training and other forms of direct technical assistance to those
involved in consensus building.
Meetings of public bodies, city councils, and commissions have followed formalized
procedures that regulate debate over differences. Consensus building, in contrast, requires
listening, cooperating with opponents, and looking for common ground. These methods can
be taught through workshops to group leaders, who in turn teach their colleagues. The state
could designate the task to university mediation groups, professional mediators in the private
sector, or a state office. This is a low-cost activity that promises substantial benefits over time.
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Once regional strategies are developed, localities can make necessary changes in their
plans to make them consistent with regional strategies. A properly designed incentive structure
can assure that localities have an interest in preparing plans that are consistent with regional
strategies and state policies — and may be the most effective way of assuring local
cooperation.
To require local plans to be consistent with state or regional plans, and detailed,
centralized review of these plans, is both inefficient and politically unpopular. From
experience in other states, such as Florida or Maine, it is not even clear that such requirements
provide an effective way to coordinate local and regional actions, nor that plan consistency can
be unambiguously determined. The regional consensus group should identify its own
enforcement and compliance mechanisms for members. This type of self-policing is most
likely to be effective. In any case, a locality or region would not receive state funding for
transportation, infrastructure, schools, or other activities if they were inconsistent with state
goals, priorities, and standards, and with the regional strategy. This in itself is likely to give
localities the incentive to make plans congruent with regional strategy. The state should
explore various strategies for assuring consistency of local plans and proposals with state and
regional policy, including providing standing to certain interests and agencies to challenge the
plans and proposals, as well as using a voluntary certification process whereby a “certified”
plan would not be subject to such challenge. This is a complex matter which we believe should
be worked out over time in the process of implementing growth management.
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